When Washington and Toronto matched-up in Canada last Friday night, Amir Johnson of the Raptors came off the bench to score 18 points and grab 13 rebounds in a 106-89 win over the Wizards. ”They’re making him look like an All-Star,” someone probably said, also noting that this Washington franchise has seemed peculiarly deft doing so over the years. During my time following the team since 1990, nights like Johnson’s certainly don’t seem like an anomaly. But just how good is Washington at making otherwise mediocre opponents look like All-Stars? And how does Washington compare to other teams?

I used the glorious Basketball-Reference.com database to search for answers. First I needed to set up some requirements:

1. Since Johnson is the subject, I wanted someone who has scored at least 18 points and grabbed 10 rebounds off the bench. Certainly a guard could look like an All-Star with 17 points and 8 assists off the bench, as would a non-starter scoring 25 points in a reserve role (ignoring other stats), but I eliminated them for this particular exercise. Also, you could certainly have a no-name starter put up All-Star stats, but assuming he’s starting with other quality talent, his success is somewhat dimmed. A bench player it is.
2. The player’s team has to win the game. Because All-Stars, or at least All-Star efforts, always are victorious, right? (No, not right, but just another factor of elimination for this post.)

Basketball-Reference.com returned 662 instances of a player tallying at least 18 and 10 off the bench, in a win, since 1985-86, the extent of BBR’s dataset (this includes Johnson’s 18 and 13, by the way). However, the results needed to be narrowed down further:

• Surely All-Stars come off the bench for one reason or another, so I had to eliminate them… anyone who has ever been an All-Star at least once (whether they actually played in the game or not).
• I also wanted to eliminate those who have won the NBA’s 6th Man Award, since putting up numbers off the bench is kind of what they are supposed to do/are good at.
• Thus, eliminated were the likes of A.C. Green (All-Star), Antawn Jamison (6th Man/All-Star), Roy Tarpley (6th Man), Shawn Kemp (All-Star), Detlef Schrempf (All-Star/6th Man), Hakeem Olajuwon (All-Star, came off the bench to put up 18 and 12 for the Rockets in 1991 for some reason), and many, many more. 
• In total, there were 239 of 662 instances of 18 and 10 off the bench in a win by non-All-Stars/6th Man Award winners.

The remaining 423 instances were accomplished by 212 different players; 26 of those 423 instances came against the Washington franchise, second most after Golden State (36), and more than Denver (24), Sacramento (22), and Indiana (21). As you can see, there’s a reason why so many of these performances seem familiar to Wizards fans.

So who has performed like an All-Star with at least 18 points and 10 rebounds off the bench in a win against Washington? 22 different players have. Here we go…

1. Charles Davis (Bucks) – 3/18/1986 (26 pts, 10 rebs)
2. Thurl Bailey (Jazz) – 11/24/1987 (18 pts, 14 rebs)
3. Ron Anderson (Sixers) – 2/1/1989 (18 pts, 13 rebs)
4. Greg Anderson (Spurs) – 3/28/1989 (20 pts, 10 rebs)
5. Hot Rod Williams (Cavaliers) – 1/5/1990 (18 pts, 14 rebs), 3/28/1991 (18 pts, 14 rebs) and 3/16/1992 (25 pts, 11 rebs)
6. Jerry Reynolds (Magic) – 4/19/1991 (24 pts, 14 rebs)
7. Loy Vaught (Clippers) – 2/18/1993 (20 pts, 14 rebs)
8. Dino Radja (Celtics) – 12/1/1993 (22 pts, 10 rebs) and 4/9/1995 (20 pts, 12 rebs)
9. Chris Gatling (Warriors) - 1/26/1995 (18 pts, 12 rebs)
10. Alan Henderson (Hawks) – 1/9/1998 (18 pts, 11 rebs)
11. Marcus Camby (Knicks) – 3/11/1999 (19 pts, 12 rebs) and 4/6/2000 (21 pts, 15 rebs)
12. Kelvin Cato (Rockets) – 12/23/1999 (20 pts, 12 rebs)
13. Billy Owens (Warriors) – 2/20/2000 (18 pts, 12 rebs)
14. Lorenzen Wright (Hawks) – 11/28/2000 (23 pts, 12 rebs)
15. Marcus Fizer (Bulls) – 3/1/2002 (19 pts, 10 rebs)
16. LaMarcus Aldridge (Blazers) – 2/11/2007 (18 pts, 10 rebs) *Note: could be an All-Star soon.
17. Chris Anderesen (Nuggets) – 3/20/2009 (18 pts, 11 rebs)
18. Ersan Ilyasova (Bucks) – 3/3/2010 (19 pts, 10 rebs)
19. Toney Douglas (Knicks) – 11/5/2010 (19 pts, 10 rebs)
20. Charlie Villanueva (Pistons) – 11/21/2010 (25 pts, 11 rebs)
21. Thaddeus Young (Sixers) – 2/23/2011 (18 pts, 10 rebs)
22. Amir Johnson (Raptors) – 2/3/2012 (18 pts, 13 rebs)

Quite a distinctive list. But what about Washington? They’ve certainly had instances where a mediocre Wizards/Bullets player has been made to look like an All-Star by an opponent. Indeed they have. It’s happened 10 times courtesy of 8 different players:

1. John “Hot Plate” Williams – 12/18/1988 (22 pts, 10 rebs vs LAL); 1/10/1989 (25 pts, 10 rebs vs DEN); 3/17/1989 (23 pts, 10 rebs at NJN)
2. Gheorghe Muresan – 4/24/1994 (21 pts, 11 rebs vs CHH)
3. Christian Laettner – 3/10/2001 (26 pts, 11 rebs vs NJN)
4. Tyrone Nesby – 2/15/2002 (18 pts, 10 rebs at PHO)
5. Kwame Brown – 1/2/2003 (20 pts, 12 rebs at CHI)
6. Etan Thomas – 11/19/2003 (18 pts, 10 rebs vs CLE)
7. Andray Blatche – 11/25/2008 (25 pts, 12 rebs vs GSW)
8. JaVale McGee – 4/6/2010 (25 pts, 15 rebs vs GSW)

Ahh… a veritable who’s who of Washington Wizards/Bullets non-All-Star All-Stars. What fun. So who’s got next?

Other reads from Truth About It:

• April 22, 2009 -- Wizards Fans, The Date is May 19th
• October 3, 2011 -- Washington Wizards Suspensions & Fines Since 1995
• May 22, 2009 -- Addressing JaVale McGee Trade Rumors

According to BasketballValue.com, 177 different five-man units have seen action for the Washington Wizards this season. 177 sounds like a lot, but only 54 of those units have seen more than five minutes of court time together, so this post/results will focus on those, i.e., no need to include units such as John Wall, Jordan Crawford, Roger Mason, Rashard Lewis and Jan Vesely, who have seen a total of 0.03 minutes on the court together.

Five units have seen 31.75-percent of the total action. Those five units are:

1. Wall – Young – Lewis – Blatche – McGee (10.44% of court time, 110.25 minutes)
2. Wall – Young – Singleton – Booker – McGee (7.1%, 74.97)
3. Wall – Young – Singleton – Blatche – McGee (5.81%, 61.37)
4. Wall – Young – Lewis – Vesely – McGee (4.46%, 47.1)
5. Wall – Crawford – Lewis – Blatche – McGee (3.93%, 41.55)

Of those 54 “five minutes or more” lineups, these are the top five in Offensive Rating (an estimation of points scored per 100 possesions):

1. Mack – Crawford – Mason – Lewis – Seraphin (158.82 Off Rtg; 9.58 minutes)
2. Mack – Young – Singleton – Booker – Seraphin (140; 5.27)
3. Wall – Crawford – Young – Vesely – Blatche (137.5; 8.28)
4. Mack – Young – Singleton – Booker – Turiaf (136.36; 6.07)
5. Wall – Young – Booker – Lewis – Seraphin (136.36; 5.62)

What is obvious and curious here is that Shelvin Mack, not John Wall, leads three of the top five most productive offensive units; JaVale McGee is not in sight. Worth noting, the unit ranked sixth in productive offense includes Wall, Crawford, Young, Booker and McGee (135.29 Off Rtg; 18.08 minutes).

The worst offense… These six units provide the least amount of points per 100 possessions:

1. Wall – Crawford – Young – Blatche – McGee (53.33 Off Rtg; 7.8 minutes)
2. Wall – Young – Lewis – Vesely – Blatche (58.82; 7.38)
3. Mack – Crawford – Singleton – Vesely – Blatche (61.54; 6.2)
4. Wall – Crawford – Singleton – Booker – McGee (62.5; 12.5)
5. Wall – Crawford – Booker – Lewis – Blatche (63.64; 5.98)
6. Wall – Mason – Young – Booker – McGee (63.64; 11.08)

Note: Units 5 and 6 tied in Offensive Rating; John Wall is heavily present here, as is Andray Blatche. 

What about defense? These are the top five best defensive units (ranked by Defensive Rating, the estimated number of points allowed per 100 possessions):

1. Wall – Crawford – Young – Vesely – McGee (50 Def Rtg; 7.9 minutes)
2. Wall – Crawford – Booker – Lewis – Seraphin (54.55; 6.47)
3. Wall – Young – Lewis – Blatche – Seraphin (57.14; 6.87)
4. Wall – Young – Lewis – Turiaf – Blatche (62.5; 6.83)
5. Mack – Young – Singleton – Booker – Seraphin (66.67; 5.27)

Wall is in four of these five defensive lineups? Yes, Nick Young is in four too. Also notice that Kevin Seraphin and Rashard Lewis are involved in three each; JaVale McGee appears just once on the Wizards’ top defensive squads.

Defense… the worst lineups:

1. Wall – Crawford – Young – Blatche – McGee (150 Def Rtg; 7.8 minutes)
2. Wall – Crawford – Lewis – Turiaf – Blatche (150; 5.92)
3. Wall – Young – Singleton – Lewis – Turiaf (146.15; 5.52)
4. Mack – Crawford – Mason – Vesely – Seraphin (138.46; 6.38)
5. Mack – Crawford – Young – Booker – McGee (136.36; 5.8)

Hello, Jordan Crawford…

HOWEVER, since this is not some silly sport like football (just kidding football, I love you… although I’m still considering boycotting the Super Bowl because I dislike both teams that much… another convo) with specialists playing just one side of the ball, and since often in basketball, good defense can lead to g0od offense, let’s take a look a look at which lineups (within the pool of 54) play the best combination of basketball (Offensive Rating minus Defensive Rating):

1. Mack – Young – Singleton – Booker – Seraphin (140 Off Rtg, 66.67 Def Rtg; Net = +73.33)
2. Wall – Crawford – Young – Vesely – McGee (106.67 Off, 50 Def; Net = +56.67)
3. Wall – Crawford – Booker – Lewis – Seraphin (107.69 Off, 54.55 Def; Net = +53.15)
4. Wall – Young – Lewis – Blatche – Seraphin (106.67 Off, 57.14 Def; Net = +49.52)
5. Wall – Crawford – Young – Booker – Seraphin (127.27 Off, 81.82 Def; Net = +45.45)

Wall is around, Young is in four lineups, Crawford is in two (two units feature the Wall/Crawford/Young three-guard lineup), and Seraphin holds down the center position in four of the units, JaVale McGee just one.

The worst units, in totality:

1. Wall – Crawford – Young – Blatche – McGee (53.33 Off Rtg, 150 Def Rtg; Net = -96.67)
2. Wall – Young – Singleton – Lewis – Turiaf (71.43 Off, 146.15 Def; Net = -74.73)
3. Wall – Crawford – Singleton – Booker – McGee (62.5 Off, 130.44 Def; Net = -67.93) 
4. Mack – Crawford – Mason – Vesely – Seraphin (76.92 Off, 138.46 Def; Net = -61.54)
5. Mack – Crawford – Young – Booker – McGee (76.92 Off, 136.36 Def; Net = -59.44)

Crawford, McGee, Young and Wall are the most prevalent amongst these units (and those guys do play a lot, so….).

What does this all mean? It depends. Some people put a ton of stock in plus/minus numbers from various perspectives. The sample size of 22 games, one-third of a lockout-shortened season, could be too small (although probably enough to give a loo-see). Other important factors hide behind the curtain of these numbers… Which units may have seen better competition, compared to those that got run versus the Bobcats. To note, the Wizards have played the 12th toughest schedule according to Basketball-Reference.com. Also, the numbers behind BasketballValue’s “1 Year Adj. +/- (Adjusted Plus-Minus)” which goes to account for “both the teammates and the opponents on the floor” only reflects data for the top ten Wizards lineups in minutes. Also, there’s been a coaching change which seems to have mixed things up quite a bit.

Nonetheless, interesting fodder, don’t you think?

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 5, 2012 -- The Wizards Said WHAT? Randy Wittman Is Searching Too
• January 30, 2012 -- DC Council Game 20: Wizards 102 at Bobcats 99: ‘W’ is for Wittman
• January 28, 2012 -- DC Council Game 19: Wizards 76 at Rockets 103: Remember Us? We Didn’t Get Fired.

The Wizards held an 83-82 lead over Boston midway through the 4th quarter, but didn’t have enough answers to close out the game. The C’s cruised to their second road victory of the year, their second in Washington D.C., despite being without Rajon Rondo (who missed the game with a wrist injury) and Ray Allen (who left in the second quarter with a jammed ankle). That’s because Paul Pierce commanded much of the attention as the key piece in the Celtics’ offense, scoring 14 of his season-high 34 points in the final period.

The Wizards didn’t have an offensive crutch in the clutch, and it cost them. But Flip Saunders, in his post game presser, argued that a tough defense is just as important as a single reliable scoring threat in the closing minutes of a basketball game:

“You have to close out with your defense, that’s how you close out games, Close out with your defense and try to get some pushes up the floor and get some open floor stuff if you can. What you have to do is stay aggressive and flatten out the defense. The ball has to get below the free throw line extended. You can’t play late in games without a thrust to the basket, the ball getting down low. When the call is just a play above the top of the key, it puts too much pressure on you.”

Saunders also added that the Wizards need to get rid of the ball, make quicker decisions and let others make the play — three things the coach has stressed all season long. But you can’t rely on your defense to create offense in every game, in every clutch situation, especially against a team like Boston.

“They just did a great job of scoring,” said John Wall after the game. “When they were scoring, it was tough to get out and push against them. Their bigs do a good job of getting back and they don’t go for too many offensive rebounds so it was hard to run on them.”

When the Wizards are forced to play in the half court — and run Flip Saunders’ system — they score fewer points. John Wall had something to say about this, too:

“I think we’re a more up-and-down team. Halfcourt we’re okay, we’re not a great halfcourt team. We go 1-on-1 too much.”

The Wizards can score as long as they can run. When the game slows down by nature or strategic design, they get caught. Without a roster that can definitively to turn defensive possessions into transition scoring opportunities, or even a lockdown defender that isn’t to be messed with, the Wizards will need to draw up an offensive solution. Saunders wants quicker decisions, but where will those lead to without a go-to scorer? Who do you trust? These are questions to which the Wizards simply don’t have answers.

To find out just how badly the team is getting throttled in the clutch — defined as the 4th quarter over overtime, with less than five minutes left and neither team ahead by more than five points — I turned to 82games.com (statistics accurate as of January 18, 2012).

John Wall has played in every clutch situation this season, but has a net plus-minus of minus-23. While he’s scoring 21.2 points in the clutch (per 48 minutes), half of which come from free throws given he’s shooting just 25-percent from the floor. Worse, Wall has has no assists (to two turnovers), no rebounds, and just one block.

Nick Young, who has been a part of 94-percent of the Wizards’ clutch minutes, is shooting 33-percent from the field and scoring 11.3 points (per 48 minutes). He doesn’t get to the line, doesn’t grab rebounds and doesn’t help others score.

Chris Singleton has seen 44-percent of Washington’s clutch minutes this season, but hasn’t produced much with the opportunity — not that he’s expected to: no points, no assists, no blocks, but one turnover.

JaVale McGee has yet to score in the clutch, despite playing almost 50-percent of the minutes. McGee has missed both of his clutch free throw attempts (where he’s shooting 40.9-percent on the season), but has registered both a rebound and a blocked shot. So there’s that.

Andray Blatche, meanwhile, is scoring 11. 1 points (per 48 clutch minutes) on 50-percent shooting, while also grabbing a third of available defensive rebounds in the clutch. By the numbers, he’s the Wizards most reliable offense creator in the clutch. Will anyone hear this over the boos? Would it even matter? Probably not.

The Wizards have lost three of their past four games, the lone win coming against an Oklahoma City Thunder team that “came out careless“ in every sense of the word. In that span, they’ve been outscored 52 to 47 in the clutch. That doesn’t sound dooming, and it isn’t, but every possession matters in clutch situations, the outcome of every play carries greater weight. The Wizards have lost in the clutch in every game but one, in which they matched Oklahoma City’s 15-point output. And remember, the Wizards have been on a home stand, the past four games were played in D.C.

This isn’t a complete picture of the Wizards struggles in key moments, but it does give some indication of how poorly they perform at the end of games. Defense can slow the opposition, but at some point, you have to find a way to put the ball in the hoop. Until they draft, develop or trade for a talent that can take control of a game like Paul Pierce, the Wizards, as a last-placed collection of individuals, will have to find a solution together.

“Paul (Pierce) carried us,” said Ray Allen after Sunday night’s game. “He played great for us. Everybody rallied behind him and everybody was just in great position. This is probably one of our best offensive games. We had good ball movement and did the things we needed to do to score.”

Follow @JohnCTownsend

Other reads from Truth About It:

• January 23, 2012 -- DC Council Game 16: Wizards 94 vs Celtics 100: It Matters In The End
• January 22, 2012 -- DC Council Game 15: Wizards 104 vs. Nuggets 108: Toast, A Denver Omelette & @JCraw55′s Shades On The Side
• January 20, 2012 -- DC Council Game 14: Wizards 105 vs Thunder 102: From Subway To Chicken Wings

The Wizards have been bad, and for the most part, that’s okay, even somewhat expected. Even those who contribute so-called “wicked pixels” understand that the rebuild will take time. After all, some of us, such as this person typing, have been ardent followers of the franchise since years before current team owner Ted Leonsis even started his now since long ended career at AOL (1993), or even before the current franchise poster boy, John Wall, was born (September 6, 1990). So when the valid message of patience is preached, it shouldn’t so much be seen as a defensively pious sermon by Leonsis, but rather a navigation through rough waters by the current moderator of a public trust — a team which is the property of the community, not of the current proprietors who aim to make money and promote positive influences though said team.

Proprietors of wicked pixels, depending on the source, can be the equivalent of a guy manning the Crow’s Nest of the ship sending a message to those in the galley about how rough the waters are. Not exactly helpful… they know it’s rough in the galley, they can feel the waves. Still, the perspective of outside insight is always a necessity. Thus, there exceptions to being bad in a rebuild. The main one being actually looking bad in being bad. Sure, against the Bulls the Wizards scored a franchise-low 64 points. Sure, they fell apart at the very end as the team has been wont to do. But the key is that they didn’t look unexpectedly bad. New starters Trevor Booker and Chris Singleton displayed infectious toughness. The team fought against a very solid Bulls team, even without M.V.P. Derrick Rose. Yes, bad decision-making and lack of focus hurt in the game-determining stretch, but the Wizards didn’t lose, for the most part, because they played like they didn’t care. They lost because they lacked talent. Lack of capability leading to failure in a rebuild is OK, lack of wherewithal is not.

Beyond development, beyond patience, beyond hope, the Wizards franchise can ill-afford to not adjust standards according to the current job auditions, or rather, continued poor performance when it comes to the simple desire of player to earn his pay. Navigating rebuild voyages also comes with sensitive lines amongst influences of culture. It’s a long trip across rough seas, and no matter how great someone might be at being a deckhand, if they have a negative influence on the rest of the crew, throw him off the ship. Else an unwilling and unknowing mutiny could form to wash the nautical charts away in an unexpected wave of trouble, leaving the vessel in a continued, directionless state.

All of this nonsense aside, let’s get into another aspect of being bad: measurables. Below is a chart with data courtesy of mySynergySports.com. “PPP” stands for Points Per Possession, a possession being defined by Synergy as a play that ends in a field-goal attempt, a turnover, or free-throws. The chart reflects the various types of plays tracked by Synergy on both offense and defense. The comparison is between the Wizards of 2010-11 and the Wizards through this current season’s first 10 games. Percent (%) Time reflects how often the Wizards run said play type on offense/how often they see them on defense.

Observations:

•  The Wizards are much worse on offense across the board. PPP in Transition has improved slightly, as the Wizards are also running more. PPP from Offensive Rebounds is about the same, although the Wizards are rebounding on offense less. PPP from Hand Off offensive plays has increased 27.5-percent, but worth noting that in both the last two seasons, Hand Off plays only account for 0.8-percent of the offense.
• The Wizards have regressed the most in P&R Roll Man plays, PPP on offense decreasing 18-percent, followed by Isolation plays (18-percent PPP decrease), Spot-Up plays (16-percent PPP decrease), and P&R Ball Handler plays (15.8-percent PPP decrease). But also notice that each of those four aforementioned play types have decreased in the percent of the time that the Wizards run them.
• Post-Up plays have increased from 8.1-percent of the offense to 14-percent, but just like most other aspects, PPP produced on Post-Ups have decreased by 10.3-percent (0.78 PPP to 0.70).
• Contrary to those with assumptions, the Wizards have improved on defense. In fact, their overall 0.83 PPP allowed is ranked seventh in the NBA by Synergy. Last season their 0.91 PPP allowed ranked 17th in the league. The defense would probably look even better if the Wizards’ offense wasn’t so bad.
• The Wizards have 0bviously gotten less effective in defending Spot-Up and Cut plays. This could be for a myriad of reasons, but from my observations, perimeter players need to improve their ability to stay in front of ball handlers across the board, Jordan Crawford leading the way in futility.
• The Wizards have made the most improvement, however, in defending against Isolations, decreasing their PPP allowed by a whopping 41.7-percent (0.84 PPP allowed last season to 0.49 this season, which is ranked first in the NBA). This could simply be a reflection of many of the Wizards being capable one-on-one defenders, but generally less-than-aware team defenders.
• Flip Saunders, early in the season/training camp, announced that his team had not worked as much on pick-and-roll defense as he would’ve liked. The coach also often observes, or rather, places blame on the big men for lacking P&R defense. And he’s right, most of it is usually on the bigs and their ability to communicate, but the Wizards guards could also stand to improve a lot in their P&R defensive decision-making — it doesn’t seem like Saunders acknowledges that enough, but he’s also a very experienced NBA coach. I am not.
• That being said, the Wizards have decreased the PPP allowed by the P&R Ball Handler by 5.9-percent (0.85 PPP to 0.80, ranked 15th in the NBA), and have decreased the PPP allowed by the P&R Roll Man by 15-percent (1.06 PPP to 0.90, ranked 10th in the NBA).

Conclusion:

If the Wizards simply become smarter on offense, take better shots and limit unforced turnovers, the overall turnaround could be noticeable, if not drastic. Although, with the current personnel, that’s asking a lot. Still, Washington’s turnover percentage (TOV% via Basketball-Reference.com) is .138, tied with the Charlotte Bobcats for 11th lowest in the NBA — meaning, the Wizards turn the ball over about 13.8 times per 100 plays. Portland is tops in the league, only turning the ball over around 12.3 times per 100 plays; Detroit is the worst, giving the ball away about 16.7 times per 100 plays. The League average is 14.3.

Saunders admittedly spent much more time on defense in training camp than offense. The coach also, essentially admittedly, thinks his players don’t pay as much attention as they need to be when it comes to scouting reports, likely both what the other teams does and what his team is supposed to be doing, offensively speaking. But ultimately it comes down to discipline. Can Saunders instill team-wide discipline when a couple of bad eggs are more than capable of contaminating the whole batch? (Lack of offensive talent be damned, because the coach’s experienced and knowledgeable offensive system should still be producing better in spite of what’s available.)

In all likelihood, unless it gets really, really bad (I know, you’re probably asking yourself, ‘Isn’t it pretty bad already?’), Saunders likely has a full slate of 56 more games to see what progress his team can make offensively. Because another ‘in all likelihood’ … Ted Leonsis would rather respond to pixels about 30-cent tickets all day instead of paying Saunders not to coach over the remainder of a four-year, $18 million contract that extends through the 2012-13 season.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• December 9, 2011 -- A Couple Washington Wizards Training Camp Musings
• May 3, 2010 -- Ted Leonsis Into Advanced Stats, Will Ernie Grunfeld Follow Suit?
• February 5, 2012 -- The Wizards Said WHAT? Randy Wittman Is Searching Too

In terms of winning percentage and shooting, two kind of big things in basketball, this lockout-shortened season could be rock-bottom for the rebuild of the Washington Wizards. And in terms of record books and scoring, it is. They scored 64 points tonight against Chicago, a franchise all-time low, to 78 points for the Bulls. The previous Washington franchise low was 65 points scored in an away game against the New Jersey Nets on December 13, 2002.

The Wizards shot 31-percent from the field on Wednesday in Chicago, at least they shot 36.6-percent that night in New Jersey — and Michael Jordan and Larry Hughes were chucking up shots (14-34 FGs, 31 points combined) instead of Jordan Crawford and Nick Young (6-23 FGs, 19 points combined).

Speaking of Young and Crawford, their shooting and passing stats this year:

>Crawford is shooting 33.3% from the field
while averaging 17.9 FGAs per 36 minutes as well as 3.6 assists/36.

>Young is shooting 37.7% from the field
while averaging 16.8 FGAs per 36 minutes as well as 1.7 assists/36.

In Young’s first five NBA seasons, he’s averaged 2.0, 1.9, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.9 assists per 36 minutes. So he’s not passing as much as ever so far in his sixth season.

In terms of Crawford, pretty much no one since 1961 has averaged more than 18 minutes per game and greater than 17.5 FGAs per 36 minutes while shooting less than 34% from the field… Other than Jamal Crawford with the Portland Trailblazers this season. How fitting.

Nick Young is 26-years old. Jordan Crawford is 23-years old. Um… Kids?

Otherwise, Chris Singleton and Trevor Booker look like great starters and JaVale McGee, dare I say, is making encouraging progress.

Oh yea, John Wall did this:

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 3, 2012 -- Top Wizards 5-Man Lineups: One-Third of The Season Is Over Edition
• January 12, 2012 -- DC Council Game 10: Wizards 64 at Bulls 78: How Low Can You Go? The Wizards Limbo In Chicago
• December 9, 2011 -- A Couple Washington Wizards Training Camp Musings

[Washington, DC Ward 6 Anacostia Rec Center - photo: K. Weidie]

A free-throw, the most efficient shot in basketball. But the clear irony is that the easiest way to get buckets, son (shout out to Oleksiy Pecherov, who is tearing it up in the Ukrainian Superleague), is often the most ignored difference-maker in games, unless they come at the very end. Then everyone knows the implications, and everyone is watching. It can get pretty lonely at the free-throw line in one’s thoughts.

In a sport where so many flowing events occur at once, instances where observers can focus on one man with the ball are relatively nonexistent. A solo fast-break is one (imagine Dwyane Wade in the passing lane), but even he must watch his back for a futilely hustling defender. Free-throws are another instance. On the court, nothing else is happening, aside the mental and physical jostling along the lane’s hash marks. White noise ready to rebound. All basketball-curious eyes are on a single, methodical routine. The line can be even more of an island when it’s a technical free-throw.

In 2010-11, 11 out of 30 NBA teams attempted 2000 or more free-throws, including the likes of Chicago, Oklahoma City, Miami and Orlando. The cumulative winning percentage of those eleven teams was 0.542. Ten out of 30 teams attempted 1900 or less free-throws, including the likes of Golden State, Detroit and New Jersey. The cumulative winning percentage of those ten teams was 0.508. There are, of course, exceptions. The 19-win Cleveland Cavaliers attempted the eighth most free-throws in the NBA with 2,075. The 57-win, World Champion Dallas Mavericks finished 27th in attempts with 1850. The Washington Wizards finished one attempt above the league average with 1,999, tied with the Charlotte Bobcats for 12th most in the NBA.

Getting to the line in abundance is one thing, making them is another. Washington finished tied with that Cleveland team with a 0.745 free-throw percentage, good enough for 24th league-wide. Free-throws are part of the “Four Factors” of winning basketball (offensively and defensively), popularized by statistician Dean Oliver. Oliver estimates free-throws as 15-percent of success, compared to shooting (40%), turnovers (25%), and rebounding (20%). Free-throw success in this sense is measured by the ratio of free-throws made to field-goals attempted. In 2010-11, Washington finished with an offensive FT/FGA ratio of 0.216, ranked 23rd in the NBA.

But let’s get into some numbers that really drive home the point: free-throws in close games. The Wizards lost eight games by six points or less last season. Their cumulative free-throw percentage in those games was 0.686. They won 12 games by six points or less. In those games they shot 0.794 from the line. That 10.8-percent is significant.

It’s a stretch to assume that the Wizards would’ve won those eight games had they made more free-throws, putting their record at 31-51 and their lottery position back a couple spots to the later hindsight and chagrin of fans. But it sure would’ve been nice to beat the Miami Heat on December 18, 2010, the day of the Gilbert Arenas trade. The Wizards went 6-10 from the line in the fourth quarter of a 95-94 loss (they were 18-26 for the game). Kirk Hinrich, Hilton Armstrong and Josh Howard (twice) all had trips to the line making only one of two; Al Thornton sank both of his attempts midway through the period. Hinrich missed his with 12 seconds left. Dwyane Wade made both of his with seven seconds left. Miami took the one point victory.

It doesn’t matter now, but it will matter when Washington is trying to make the playoffs, and even further, when playoff seeding counts. That brings us to the culprits.

JaVale McGee attempted 230 free-throws last season, he made 134 for a percentage of 0.583. And he has gotten worse from the line over his young career. As a rookie McGee attempted 162 and made 0.660 of them. As an NBA soph he attempted 116 and sank them at a 0.638 clip. The Wizards cannot afford for their starting center to get worse from the line as his tenure continues. If he simply improved from his rookie campaign to his third year toward a rate of 0.691 last season (which means only making 25 more free-throws in 2010-11), the Wizards jump up four spots to be tied with the Milwaukee Bucks for 20th best free-throw percentage in the NBA.

But McGee clearly isn’t the only one. In fact, when it comes to the importance of free-throws the Wizards should look at their team leader first. In 69 games John Wall led the Wizards in free-throw attempts (393 — 5.7 attempts/game ) and makes (301); his attempts ranked 30th in the NBA. Out of the 31 players with 390 or more attempts in 2010-11, Wall’s 0.766 free-throw percentage ranks 24th; one spot ahead of LeBron James, one spot behind Brook Lopez (source: Basketball-Reference.com):

• Chris Paul >> .847 (6.0)
• Calvin Murphy >> .820 (5.3)
• Russell Westbrook >> .815 (5.2)
• Phil Ford >> .813 (5.1)
• Mitch Richmond >> .810 (6.4)
• Pete Maravich >> .800 (6.2)
• Sarunas Marciulionis >> .787 (5.4)
• Earl Monroe >> .781 (7.9)
• Geoff Petrie >> .772 (7.3)
• Travis Mays >> .770 (5.2)
• John Wall >> .766 (5.7)
• Tiny Archibald >> .757 (5.4)
• Tyreke Evans >> .748 (6.5)
• Dwyane Wade >> .747 (5.1)
• Stephon Marbury >> .727 (5.0)
• Isiah Thomas >> .704 (6.0)
• Allen Iverson >> .702 (7.2)
• Jerry West >> .666 (6.3)

Shooting coaches, scientists and roundball kinesiologists can help hone technique and functionality, but improvement in individuals can be wide-ranging. The consensus, however, that most experts might agree upon is A) technique can improve in consistency with consistent practice; B) focusing on a routine and the process can help tune-out external factors (such as nerves and crowd noise), and C) mental clarity helps — spend time practicing A and B, and when it comes to the game, just shoot the ball. Don’t think about anything else.

John Wall is filming commercials for Reebok in Paris with yellow sports cars. JaVale McGee is dunking in suits for GQ while being aggressive with his plaids. Both players have no doubt been working on their games, in addition to their personal brand. Have you seen the Wall lockout basketball highlights from HoopsMixTape.com? McGee has recently tweeted about pool workouts and going for runs around Runyon Canyon in Hollywood, CA. Even Andray Blatche is working hard with trainer Joe Connelly to become more consistent, as he can also improve upon his 0.777 free-throw percentage in 2010-11, which was a career best, aside from his rookie season when he made 10 of 12.

These Wizards are coming back ready and will be top shape. Because Wall already set the example and Flip Saunders makes the rules: be conditioned to get down the court with John or watch him do it from the sideline; and also, don’t get caught running up hill on defense.

There will be no ’98 lockout hangover in D.C.. Don’t be surprised if the city quickly embraces this young bunch. Hopefully they’ve been working on their cerebral basketball games as well. Wall undoubtedly has. And when it comes to free-throws, here’s to hoping that the Wiz Kids have been working so hard that they don’t have to think at all. The loneliness at the free-throw line need not be enduring, especially after big makes, but nobody wants to keep company with an arena full of groans.

>>> This is John Wall.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 3, 2012 -- Top Wizards 5-Man Lineups: One-Third of The Season Is Over Edition
• August 15, 2011 -- ShareBullets: Alyssa Milano Is Everywhere, Including The Wizards Website
• February 9, 2011 -- Where’s The Clutch?

I’ve previously used historical statistical analysis in an attempt to determine who were some of the best, and worst, shooters in Wizards/Bullets franchise history.

One post explained that Slick Leonard might have had to worst shooting season in franchise record books. As a member of the ‘61-62 Chicago Packers, Leonard threw up 1,128 shots, second most on the team after Walt Bellamy, but only made 37.5-percent of them. In a nine team league that season 30 players attempted 1,000 or more field-goals, and Slick was the worst of them all.

Others, such as Kevin Loughery and Mitch Richmond, have cemented themselves as some of the worst shooters beyond the window of just one season. Loughery, over 591 career games played with the team in Baltimore, made only 41.5-percent of his 9,209 FG attempts. Richmond, who adeptly bastardized any memories of trading Chris Webber into scorn from fandom toward his aching knees, made just 41.7-percent of the 2,356 shots he took as a Wizard. To note, Loughery and Richmond were two of 26 players in franchise history to play in 160 games or more with the team and average over 15 field-goals attempted per 36 minutes.

Another post noted that Gilbert Arenas is the best long-range bomber in team history, and that some of the franchise’s better shooters — over various time periods, from everywhere on the court… twos, threes and ones — have been Brent Price, Mike Miller, Scott Skiles, Chris Whitney, Tracy Murray, Antawn Jamison and Caron Butler.

Shooting is more about confidence than any statistic will ever measure. That sometimes is the irony of statistics, in that they measure confidence but they cannot measure levels of one’s ability to enact confidence. The playoffs is where elevated, or decimated, levels of confidence can be measured.

Three-pointers, two-pointers and free-throws. Inside, outside, and on the run. To make all requires some degree of confidence. Being sure that mechanics and touch, practiced over and over again, along with a focused eye, will guide that ball through the net … knowing that bodily trained repetition will do what the mind wants it to do. Except with NBA-tough defense and the game on the line, a playoff game.

Playoff Shooters.

In Washington Wizards franchise playoff history, extending to Baltimore and Chicago, as the Zephyrs, Packers and Bullets, 79 different players have played at least a game’s worth of minutes, 48, while averaging 12 or more minutes per game. ¹

“True shooting percentage (TS%) is a measure of shooting efficiency that takes into account field goals, 3-point field goals, and free throws.” -Basketball-Reference.com

Of the 79 players, those whose playoff TS% increased the most from their career regular season TS% with the franchise goes as follows:

1. Tracy Murray  +18.7% (1997)
2. Chris Webber +16.5% (1997)
3. Michael Ruffin +14.8% (2005-07)
4. Wali Jones +7.6% (1965)
5. Brendan Haywood +5.6% (2005-08)
6. Dudley Bradley +5.1% (1985-86)
7. Don Ohl +4.6% (1965-66)
8. Wayne Hightower +4.5% (1965)
9. Jared Jeffries +4.4% (2005-06)
10. Nick Weatherspoon +4.4% (1974-76)

Clearly you’re wondering what this means. Michael Ruffin was better at sticking daggers into his own team than scoring, and Jared Jeffries, as a Wizard, used to miss at the rim so badly that the women in his life would make him pee outside.

But when the playoffs counted, over 19 games Ruffin went a solid 9-15 from the field, probably because he was paid attention to by defenders even less. Then again, averaging just 0.79 field-goal attempts per playoff game was probably dumb luck. Still, markedly better than Ruffin going 80-194 from the field over 185 career games with the franchise.

When the Bullets got swept by the Bulls in three games in 1997, it wasn’t because of Tracy Murray. No, it was because of Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen. Still, Murray shot lights out. In 87 total minutes he went 17-30 from the field, 5-10 from three, and 16-17 from the free-throw line.

If we’re going to check the most improved, might as well check those whose TS% dipped the most when the second season was in play:

1. Red Kerr -27.1% (1966)
2. Michael Adams -15.8% (1987)
3. DeShawn Stevenson -9.3% (2007-08)
4. Don Collins -8.0% (1982-85)
5. Eddie Miles -7.8% (1970)
6. John Tresvant -6.8% (1971-73)
7. Kwame Brown -6.7% (2005)
8. Mitch Kupchak -6.6% (1977-79)
9. Darren Daye -6.4% (1984-86)
10. Johnny Egan -5.4% (1966)

Michael Adams, unbeknownst to some, played 63 games as an NBA soph with the 1986-87 Washington Bullets. This is before he moved on to Denver for four seasons, and before he came back to play with the Bullets for three more seasons from 1991-1994.

Adams come off the bench for that ‘87 Bullets team that finished 42-40 and sixth in the East, netting them a first round match-up with the 52-30, third seed Detroit Pistons. Detroit won the series three games to zero. Adams, who averaged 20.7 minutes per game during the regular season with a TS% of .506 (.519 over his regular season career with the Bullets), saw his average minutes jump to 27.3 over those three playoff games. His playoff TS%, however, dropped off the chart to .361 — he made just 8 of 25 playoff FGAs, going 2-9 from three.

DeShawn Stevenson’s TS% drop doesn’t tell the full story that he had two vastly different playoff series. In 2006-07 when the Wizards were swept by the Cleveland Cavaliers in four games, Stevenson went 9-46 from the field and 3-19 from long distance. He even managed to miss four of his seven free-throws attempts to cement a horrendous .244 TS%. The next season, 2007-08 when the Cavs beat the Wizards in the first round 4-2, Stevenson rebounded by going 22-60 from the field (still not great), but 14-36 from three, which raised his TS% to .545 (despite going 8-24 from two-point land). In 21 playoff games with the Dallas Mavericks this past season Stevenson’s TS% was .532.

And where would this post be without mention of Kwame Brown? After the first three games against the Chicago Bulls in the 2005 playoffs, in which Kwame played 60 total minutes, got 15 total rebounds, and went 5-13 from the field, Brown pouted about playing time, went out and got drunk after game three, lied and said he was sick when he missed practice the next day, missed shoot-around and game four with continued lies, and was finally suspended for the rest of the season because of his actions. It was a very fitting way for Kwame to end his era in Washington.

As a final measure, I wanted to narrow down playoff shooters capable of getting buckets from long distances (or at least attempting them).

From the original environment of 79 players (who have played at least a game’s worth of playoff minutes, 48, while averaging 12 or more minutes per game), 17 players had a three-point attempt ratio of at least 0.10 — meaning that at least one out of every 10 field-goal attempts was a three-point shot.

The table below lists some familiar names — displaying playoff years with the Wizards/Bullets franchise, career regular season TS% with the franchise, playoff TS%, the difference, playoffs games played, playoff minutes, playoff FGAs, and the ratio of playoff 3PAs to FGAs.

Notably, as well as Murray fared on shooting in the 1997 playoffs, Webber was right there with him. In three games against Chicago Webber went 19-30 from the field, 5-11 from deep, but as the big man who fancied himself a point guard was liable to do, he only went 4-8 from the free-throw line (while again, Murray got to the stripe 17 times, making 16).

Finally, the most glaring statistical product is that the Wizards’ “Big 3” of yore — Arenas, Butler and Jamison — all became worse shooters come playoff time, with various members of their supporting cast – Roger Mason Jr., Larry Hughes, Jarvis Hayes and Stevenson — adding to the futility as well.

It’s a hard lesson learned, for all of us, but especially for Ernie Grunfeld (and former Wizards coach Eddie Jordan), that when it comes to the post-season, when shrinkage amongst shooters is likely to be more prevalent, it’s best to build a team on defense first, not scoring.

Obvious, I know, but with the allure of shooting statistics and scoring so deeply entrenched as a basis for evaluation for so long (and valuation, especially when it’s historically come to contract negotiations), it’s not a surprise.

Just be glad, Wizards fans, that the ship seems to be heading in the right direction. But they still need shooters…

Other reads from Truth About It:

• October 21, 2010 -- Worst of the Wizards/Bullets: Shooters Edition
• October 3, 2011 -- Washington Wizards Suspensions & Fines Since 1995
• November 2, 2010 -- Best of The Wizards/Bullets: Three-Point Shooting and Gilbert Arenas

Sabermetrics. They have been a continous hot topic of conversation in modern sports circles, recently sparked (and fueled) by Jonah Lehrer’s Grantland column, The Math Problem. Lehrer argued that while sabermetrics — the computerized measurement of statistics, in this case basketball data — can be extremely useful at times, the allure of definitive measures of production leads us to ignore the oft-underrated intangibles. Worse, the popular obsession with quantifiable sports values has resulted in shortsighted personnel decisions. The horror!

But this post isn’t about the great paradox of sports statistics nor whether dismissing math in sports is the right call. It’s about how Washington Wizards 2011 draft pick Jan Vesely played on paper — was he a slam dunk in Europe or something less spectacular?

The Wizards brass had their hearts and minds set on adding the 6’11” combo-forward to the roster for over two years, so I wanted to take a look at what attracted the team’s attention (assuming, of course, that the front office dabbles in advanced hoops data).

Our friendly neighborhood basketball statistician, ESPN.com’s John Hollinger, has determined that there is a predictable relationship between how a player performs in the Euroleague and how he will compete as a rookie in the Association. When transitioning to the NBA, a Euroleague player’s pace-adjusted per-minute stats will be affected as follows:

• Scoring rate decreases 25-percent
• Rebound rate increases by 18-percent
• Assist rate increases by 31-percent
• Shooting percentage drops by 12-percent
• Overall, player efficiency rating drops by 30-percent

To take a look at how Vesely did in Europe (in both the Euroleague and the Adriatic League), I pulled data from Draft Express:

2009-2010 PER 40 PACE ADJUSTED (AVG)

14.2 PPG | 55.95 FG% | 36.25 3P% | 63.5 FT% | 2.5 OREB | 7.05 TREB | 2.05 AST | 1.5 STL

2010-2011 PER 40 PACE ADJUSTED (AVG)

15.55 PPG | 56.05 FG% | 30.75 3P% | 49 FT % | 2.9 OREB | 6.25 TREB | 1.9 AST| 1.95 STL

Vesely made small improvements in several statistical categories, partly because of increased playing time — on average, he saw an additional 1:51 of game action during his 2010-2011 Partizan campaign. His field-goal percentage stayed consistent despite him taking an extra 0.75 attempts per game, which is a good sign.

Big dips in three-point and free throw percentages, however, are not what you would like to see. His inaccuracy from range is less of a worry, since scouting reports indicate that he only shoots when all other options have been exhausted — Vesely has attempted under 10 field goals per game for his career and was rarely asked to create his own shot.

Shooting below 50 percent from the stripe is a glaring disappointment, especially considering that he earned an extra 1.3 trips to the free throw line during his last season in Serbia. But on the bright side, Kevin Pelton of Basketball Prospectus has evidence that player can significantly improve his free throw shooting with practice and do so at about 0.7-percent per season through age 27.

There are also two prime examples of forwards turning their ‘luck’ at the free throw line: Chris Webber and Karl Malone. Webber improved his free throw shooting from a woeful 45.4-percent during 1998-99 to 75.1-percent in 1999-00. Malone shot 48.1-percent during his rookie season, but climbed to 70-percent during his third year in the NBA. Both players only dipped below 70 percent once for the remainder of their careers — pretty damn impressive. Obviously, these are best-case examples, but serve to illustrate that poor free throw shooting is correctable.

(The Curious Case of Brendan Haywood: Wizards fans will remember the anomalistic 2007-2008 season in which Haywood shot a career-high 73.5-percent from the free throw line. He had never approached that figure and has failed to sniff percentages that high since.)

Now, let’s see what story Vesely’s rebounding numbers tell. His 3.975 non-pace adjusted rebounds per game over the past two years looks disturbingly low, but are they really? European basketball gurus In The Game noted that while Vesely is not a game-changing rebounder, he does have the skillset and physical attributes to be a force on the boards. According to available data, Vesely recorded 4.6 rebounds per game in 2009-10. While that total didn’t rank him as one of the elite rebounders in the Euroleague, it put him in the top-10 in both offensive (9.3-percent) and defensive (16.2-percent) rebounding percentages among small forwards with more than 150 logged minutes. Those percentages were good enough to rank him 4th and 8th respectively, and above one of the better rebounding guard-forwards, Josh Childress, who played for Olympiacos Piraeus in 2008-09 and 2009-10.

Unfortunately, Vesely’s 2010-11 rebounding percentages took a hit. He pulled in 7.2-percent of the available offensive rebounds and 8.2-percent on the defensive end. Two important things to note: Partizan Belgrade was the fifth-best rebounding team in the Euroleague, hauling in 33.6-percent of offensive rebounds and 70.5-percent of defensive rebounds. Second, Vesely had a penchant for getting into transition — and why not, with the rebounding powers on the team? — where he used his made-for-YouTube speed and athleticism to punish defenses, a la Blake Griffin of the Los Angeles Clippers. His rebounding will make a difference for a Wizards team that is loathe to collect loose balls, so we can forgive some empty space on his Euroleague stat sheet.

It is time to talk briefly about detailed scoring statistics, per 28 minutes. Cue the applause. Vesely hit 65.2-percent of his shots from close range, which ranks him in the top-50 among all players in the Euroleague and top-20 among small forwards. He sank 37.5-percent of his jumpers, putting him just out of the top-50 Euroleague players, but inside the top-25 small forwards.

In 2010-2011, Vesely’s Effective Field-Goal Percentage (eFG% – a statistic that adjusts for the fact that a three-point field goal is worth one more point than a two-point field goal) was 58.2. Richard Jefferson and Peja Stojakovic had similar eFG% numbers in the NBA. His True Shooting Percentage (TS% – a measure of shooting efficiency that takes into account field goals, three-point field goals and free throws) was 56.8. Vesely’s TS% compares him to Chris Bosh, Matt Barnes, Hedo Turkoglu and, coincidently, Andrei Kirlienko, who he’s often been compared to.

Vesely has never been a great shooter, but that’s okay. Vesely doesn’t ride the J-train to work, he runs. As an added bonus, he knows his way around the rim and has a lot of potential as a back-to-the-basket scorer.

Last year, Vesely ranked in the top-20 among small forwards in Efficiency, a traditional NBA evaluatory statistic. Efficiency (PTS + REB + AST + STL + BLK – FG missed – FT missed – TO) is far from being the favorite sabermetric among basketball writers, bloggers and fans, due to a lack of formulaic emphasis on scoring efficiency. In terms of worth for the hoops community, efficiency most closely resembles the friendly neighborhood tweener who shovels your driveway during the winter — he pushes some powder, but doesn’t exactly offer an earth-moving contribution to the community. Regardless, Vesely’s efficiency rating was 10.64, not far from the Euroleague leader Fernando Sanemeterio (15.78) but well above those scraping the bottom of the barrel in the red.

Plus-minus, an estimate of his contribution to the team’s point differential per 140 possessions, is the final stop in today’s mystery metrics tour. In 2010-2011, Vesely was in the middle of the pack at plus-1.4. His team scored more points with him on the floor than without and played better defense. Even though he didn’t make a significant difference to Partizan’s box score, he didn’t hurt them either. That’s a small victory.

And perhaps plus-minus is the measure that best characterizes Jan Vesely, because when you look at the big picture — analytical metrics, statistics and game tape included — he is better than your average European small forward. Do his numbers jump off the page? Not at all, but Vesely justifies his selection with good grades in many statistical categories alone, particularly in a weak draft class.

Tagged with the hype, hope and high expectations associated with all lottery selections, the fact that Vesely is a paper tiger cub with a fierce determination to win games, even if that demands hitting the hardwood, has to make you smile.

Jan Vesely won’t win multiple scoring titles or bag handfuls of individual accolades — meaning no, he probably won’t be the next Dirk Nowitzki – but you have to give the Wizards credit for doing their homework. Vesely will have the immediate opportunity to be a reliable rotation player as soon as the next NBA season tips off. He also has the capacity to have a long, successful playing career. The question, of course, is to what extent?

Twitter: @JohnCTownsend

[Top image courtesy of Emily Van Tassel]

Other reads from Truth About It:

• January 13, 2011 -- Momma McGee On JaVale’s Dunking
• July 7, 2010 -- Wizards Team Needs: Looking For A Flier On The Wing
• June 15, 2010 -- John Wall: New Era, New Questions

[Blatche celebrates a close win over the Pistons.]

Andray Blatche. Yes, that Andray Blatche … Party All Dray. He’s been a little bit different lately, hasn’t he? Sure has. Averaging 25.6 points and 13.7 rebounds per 36 minutes in the last four games (up from his 17.4 and 8.7 respective averages per 36 for the season), since his return from injury is certainly a strong indication that things could be different for Blatche.

Straight and to the point, he’s been attacking the rim. Living in the paint. Doing the dirty work down low. All the good stuff the team has always needed Andray Blatche to do, but has never quite been satisfied.

Against the Detroit Pistons on Tuesday night, the Wizards’ third win in a row (for the first time since April 2008), Blatche forced in 26 points on 8-18 shooting. Four of his misses came from inside five-feet from the rim (which is a good thing), and he made 7-8 of his field-goal attempts within two-feet.

Another treat resulting from Dray’s interior work: free-throws. He shot 12 of them, made 10 — 12 being the third most free-throw attempts in his 378 game career (he attempted 14 twice earlier this year, a November 2 win over Philadelphia and a close November 29 loss to the Heat in Miami). Also, two of Blatche’s free-throws against the Pistons came through in the clutch, giving the Wizards a four point lead with nine seconds left. Andray nailed his after rookie Greg Monroe missed two from the line that would have tied the game with 10 seconds left. And guess who secured the strong rebound after Monroe’s second miss? You got it, the man once known as simply: “Baltche.”

But back to Andray nailing seven of his eight field-goal attempts at the rim. He’s played in 59 games this season and has had eight or more attempts at the rim in 13 of those games. When this happens, the Wizards have a 9-4 record. The opponent, however, should also be considered. These instances of rim jobs came against the likes of Charlotte (twice), Toronto (three times), Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, Indiana, Philadelphia (twice) and Miami — an average opponent winning-percentage of .400. [Note: two of Blatche's games of 10-plus field-goal attempts at the rim came last Friday versus Cleveland and last Sunday versus Charlotte.]

The Wizards have a 6-19 record when Blatche’s at-the-rim attempts are between five and seven shots per game. The average winning-percentage of those opponents is .520.

Continuing, the Wizards are 3-18 when Blatche attempts four or less shots at the rim, the average winning-percentage of those opponents is .536.

So, we’ve established that the Wizards lose when they play good teams, that they fare better when Blatche has more attempts at the rim, and that Blatche plays better against crappy opponents. Let’s look at a pretty chart to illustrate…

[stats via HoopData and Basketball-Reference.com]

A lot of this goes without saying, but the numbers, in their limited snapshot illustration, could be a measure of future expectation, IF…

…IF Blatche decides he wants to take action at the rim all the time, against tough competition. Tonight against the Pacers in Indiana will be a good test. Friday against the Celtics in Boston will be an even better test. Will Blatche work inside on the road when it might be a little harder? Or will he settle for jump shots? That’s for him to determine.

It’s nice that Ted Leonsis now wants to anoint Blatche, along with Jordan Crawford and John Wall, as the “new big three” (boy, Nick Young was quickly tossed aside, wasn’t he?), but that silliness clouds reality with marketing fluff. Who the real Andray Blatche is has yet to be seen. Let’s hope the last three games is more of a blueprint for success and less of a free, whimsical, meaningless, temporary brand of basketball.

After the Pistons win, I asked Flip Saunders, Mo Evans and John Wall about the difference they’ve seen in Andray.

Flip on Blatche last year post-trade deadline versus this recent three-game stretch:

“I think he’s been much more patient and he hasn’t gotten frustrated. Last year he might have gotten a little frustrated because he wasn’t getting the ball. [Tonight] he kept doing the things that he’s supposed to do, defensively tried to rebound, and I think he knew that we’d come back to him [on offense]. He made some big plays down the stretch, and made big free-throws.”

Mo Evans:

John Wall:

Andray grabs big rebound after Greg Monroe misses his second free-throw:

[all photos: Kyle Weidie, Truth About It.net]

Other reads from Truth About It:

• January 17, 2012 -- DC Council Game 13: Wizards 106 vs. Rockets 114: John Wall’s Big Day Brings No Rewards
• December 25, 2011 -- What You Will See: Wizards Practicing Toward A Season
• March 16, 2011 -- Under The Hoop: Washington Wizards vs. Milwaukee Bucks

{John Wall looks for Kevin Seraphin - photo: K. Weidie}

{Wall looks for a trailing Andray Blatche - photo: K. Weidie}

In contrast to John Wall dropping a Rookie-Sophomore game record 22 assists on Friday night, an NBA team achieving single digits in assists over the course of a regular season game is a pretty rare feat. According to the Basketball-Reference.com database, it’s occurred just 194 times since the 1986-87 season (the extent of BBR’s game box score database). So in roughly 0.3-percent of NBA games over the last 25 seasons. And of course, your Washington Wizards did just that on Wednesday night in Orlando, tallying a mere eight dimes divided up amongst Kirk Hinrich, who had three, along with one each from and John Wall, Kevin Seraphin, Josh Howard, Andray Blatche and Hilton Armstrong.

Teams have now put up a single-digit assist total five times this season. The Orlando Magic dropped  five assists in a 26 point loss to the Miami Heat in just their second game on the 2010-11 season (the day after Orlando blew out the Wizards by 29 points in their season home opener). The Magic also had just nine team assists in a 80-74 loss to the Atlanta Hawks on December 6, 2010. The Portland Trailblazers had eight assists in a 100-86 loss to the New York Knicks on January 11, 2011. And surprisingly enough, Chris Paul’s New Orleans Hornets put up a league season low four assists for a team in a 88-70 loss to the Philadelphia 76ers on December 12, 2010.

The Wizards last achieved the single-digit assist mark with nine on December 23, 2008 against the Charlotte Bobcats. That game, Mike James started at the point and went 4-16 from the field with one assist. DeShawn Stevenson and Nick Young were the only guards off the bench and Caron Butler led the team with four assists.

In regular season games since 1986-87, Washington has nine single-digit assist games — five with nine assists and four games with eight (and the franchise has a 2-9 record in these matches). So essentially, last Wednesday, the Wizards tied a franchise low for assists as a team over the last 25 seasons (including this season) — an environment of 1,990 games.

The franchise’s all-time low for assists in a game came on October 16, 1963 — in the season home opener against the Boston Celtics, in the franchise’s very first game in existence in Baltimore — with three whole assists in 109-95 loss to the Celtics. (Note: For current team accounting purposes, that was also first game in franchise history — the team doesn’t count the two seasons in Chicago, otherwise, the current season would be No. 50. Instead, season 50 will be celebrated in 2012-13).

So, although Wizards fans are well used to the losing, some of the “accomplishments” this season are still pretty rare … like that whole 0-25 start on the road thing. Here’s to the Wizards coming out of the All-Star break energized, refreshed and really to compete for a full 48 minutes, and sometimes more.

LINKS.

To know what Kwame Brown was thinking when he visited the Verizon Center this season and stopped to observe John Wall. TAI’s Rashad Mobley writes at…
[DCist]

What I believe is an accurate picture of the Wizards at the trade deadline.
[Bullets Forever]

Earlier this week, I did the write-up for the Most Improved Player Award as part of the NBA Awards Watch on ESPN.com. I included Nick Young on the list, but will his play keep his name in the conversation when he mostly just scores on a high volume of shots?
[ESPN.com]

Michael Lee had a good profile on John Wall in the paper.
[Washington Post]

Was Kobe Bryant full of sh*t when he told John Wall to wear Nikes? Are NBA players getting injured (and losing money) simply because they are running the wrong way? John Townsend has a great piece on all of this over at…
[HoopSpeak]

The good part of Rashard Lewis’ legacy as a member of the Orlando Magic derives from when he was instrumental in beating the heavily favored LeBron James and the Cleveland Cavaliers in the 2009 Eastern Conference Finals.
[Magic Basketball]

Good read about the whole Tim Donaghy … yes, it hasn’t gone away yet. And it seems much more likely that Donaghy did fix games than he didn’t as some, including himself, have claimed.
[TrueHoop]

A pretty good interview with James Singleton, a Washington Wizard briefly last season who is now playing in China.
[NiuBBall.com]

To one question as to why he chose to play in China instead of the NBA, Singleton says:

Being in the NBA, there’s a lot of politics to the game.  It doesn’t really depend on how talented you are; it depends on who you’re good with sometimes.  I hate to say it, but that’s just the way it is.  It’s a business, basically.

Sounds “funny” … because as it was evident at the time, NBA teams were only offering Singleton an NBA minimum salary; it’s understood that China was offering more money. Singleton clears things up when asked if he’d return to the NBA:

Yeah, I would go back to the NBA next season. But it has to a more lucrative decision.  The same thing that made me pick overseas over the NBA.  It’s more of a business decision than anything.  What people fail to understand is that at the end of the day it’s a business.

VIDEOS.

Thy name is Andray Blatche.

J.J. Reddick dies in the video below.

DeShawn Stevenson gives Marcin Gortat’s nuts a heavy dose of his elbow.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• June 8, 2011 -- ShareBullets: A Man With A Plan
• December 5, 2011 -- ShareBullets: John Wall and DeMarcus Cousins Think About The Future
• October 11, 2011 -- ShareBullets/Poll: What To Make Of This NBA Lockout

[Looking above for help in the clutch]

The Washington Wizards have been involved in 12 games out of 50 which have been decided by five points or less. Their record in those games is 7-5, with wins coming against Philadelphia (twice), Boston, Memphis, Sacramento, Toronto and Portland; the losses have come against Cleveland, Detroit, Atlanta, Orlando and Miami. Only two of the games have come on the road, the losses to the Pistons and the Hawks.

So, Washington has fared better in close games in comparison to their 13-37 record on the season overall. But the glaring problem, especially in the midst of an 0-25 road record, is that Flip Saunders does not have a player with the ability to step up as a clutch performer and truly put the team on their back when big buckets need to be scored, or when a defensive stop needs to be made.

Well, some players have the ability, it’s just that they either shy away from that role in crunch time or they become a magnified epitome of their usual inefficiencies. Whatever the case may be, no one is getting it done, especially franchise savior and No. 1 NBA Draft pick John Wall. And that’s okay. Wall will learn and develop, and hopefully the team will with him. But for now, let’s take a quick look at how some individual Wizards have fared in clutch time.

82games.com defines “clutch” time as: 4th quarter or overtime, less than 5 minutes left, neither team ahead by more than 5 points. Also worth noting that as great a NBA statistical site that 82games.com is, they are usually behind on their stats. The numbers below only cover Wizards games one through 40.

We’re also only going to look at five Wizards — those who have been with the team all season and rank 1-5 in minutes played: Andray Blatche, Nick Young, John Wall, Kirk Hinrich and JaVale McGee.

[link to spreadsheet data]

In the “entire game” column, you’ll see the amount of team points produced per 100 possessions when each of those respective players are on the floor, cumulative for the entire game. In the third column, you’ll see how the Wizards’ offense performs with each of those players on the floor during what’s defined by 82games as “clutch time.” The last column shows the difference.

As you can see, Young’s offensive influence on the team takes the largest dip in the waning moments of close games … as it also makes sense that the veteran Kirk Hinrich changes the least (even though he technically gets “worse” in clutch time, you also have to consider Hinrich’s surroundings).

Now, let’s take a look at clutch time defense.

[link to spreadsheet data]

Wizards guards are getting blasted on defense when it counts. Is Nick Young really causing his team to give up 21.8 more points per 100 possessions in clutch time over his regular floor time? It looks like it.

And what about Blatche and McGee? Blatche’s difference is rather negligible and McGee actually improves his team’s defense when on the floor during clutch time. However, as you know, statistics can be maneuvered to shine light on any dog’s ass. Anyone who watches the Wizards knows that their bigs constantly find new ways to screw up defensive help, usually on screening action. None of this, however, is to absolve the guards of defensive responsibility. Terrible defense is a team effort.

For a reference point, let’s take a look at Dirk Nowitzki, one of the most clutch scorers in the NBA. Dirk averages 50.5 points per 48 minutes of clutch time. His eFG% (a number which takes into account that three-pointers are worth more than two-pointers), jumps from .576 over the course of the entire game to .614 in clutch time.

Furthermore, when Nowitzki is on the court during the game, his Mavericks score 115.2 points per 100 possessions and allow 102 points per 100 possessions. When he’s on the floor in clutch time, the Mavericks produce 127.3 points and allow 84.1 points. That’s quite a difference on both ends of the floor for the former MVP.

The Wizards have no clutch scorers. They have no defensive stoppers. They have a long way to go before they can even turn losses in abundance into closer games and ultimately wins.

The final realization is that while Wall is great, while he can be an all-time great, it’s an illusion to think that a franchise can be built around him alone. Either the Wizards get lucky in the draft again (and at this point, count on that not happening, as Wizards fans should thank their lucky stars that they got Wall in the first place), or they build up some pieces around Wall from scratch and at some point, spend some money on another star through free-agency or a trade.

The Lakers don’t win titles without signing Shaq, the Heat don’t win without trading for Shaq, the Celtics don’t win without trading for Kevin Garnett and Ray Allen, the Pistons probably fall short without trading for Rasheed Wallace. Teams are built through the draft and brilliant maneuvers, but they are finished by ultimately ponying up money and/or resources.

The Wizards have taken the right steps, but have an unforeseeable amount of time to go, money to gamble and luck to hope for.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 11, 2011 -- Under The Hoop: Atlanta Hawks vs Washington Wizards
• February 10, 2011 -- Wizards-Bucks Quote Mix, and John Wall Greets Earl Boykins
• January 10, 2011 -- Wizards vs. Bobcats: A Chronology of 0-18 On The Road

This season, the Wizards’ defense has often been better than the offense. With the ball, on plays that have ended in a FGA, TO or FTs, Washington has tallied 0.89 points per possession (PPP), ranked 27th out of 30 NBA teams. They score 42.9-percent of the time and turn the ball over 13.7-percent of the time in these situations.

Washington’s overall offensive rating (ORtg – points produced per 100 possessions, which is calculated differently and likely includes other factors outside of plays that end in a FGA, TO or FTs) sits in line with these focused numbers; their 102.6 ORtg also ranks 27th.

The Wizards are particularly bad at scoring on post ups — which comes as no surprise considering the roster construction — chalking up a measly 0.70 PPP over 318 opportunities, a rate that’s ranked dead last in the league. Andray Blatche has produced 0.64 PPP on 121 post up opportunities, JaVale McGee has produced 0.66 PPP on 64 post ups, Yi Jianlian 0.50 PPP on 28 post ups … you get the point, the cupboards are bare, the well is dry and the children are starving.

In contrast,  the Wizards fare above average (at least in ranking comparison) on Pick-and-Roll ball handler plays on offense, producing 0.82 PPP over 567 possessions, which is ranked 12th in the NBA. John Wall clearly needs some work in this area, producing just 0.69 PPP as the offensive P&R ball handler, which ranks 106 in the league. Kirk Hinrich, on the other hand, produces 0.95 PPP as the P&R ball handler, ranked 17th. This is simply a difference in seasoned decision-making that will eventually come for Wall.

On defense, Washington allows 0.90 PPP, which is ranked 16th in the league — clearly better than being the 27th most efficient team at scoring. Who said that Flip Saunders wasn’t a defensive coach? Wizards opponents score 42.8-percent of the time and turn the ball over on 13.4-percent of the aforementioned play types.

It’s worth noting that Washington’s DRtg (defensive points allowed per 100 possessions – ORtg and DRtg taken from Basketball-Reference.com) is tied with the Denver Nuggets in ranking 21st league-wide; they give up an estimated 109.1 points per 100 possessions.

As you probably could have guessed, the Wizards don’t fare well in defending the post either. Via Synergy, on possessions that, again, end in a FGA, TO or FTs, the Wizards have allowed 0.93 PPP over 455 post up possessions, a rate that’s ranked 27th in the NBA.

Now some individual post-up defensive numbers:

• Andray Blatche – 0.93 PPP over 72 post-up defensive possessions.
• JaVale McGee – 0.96 PPP over 100 post-up defensive possessions.
• Kevin Seraphin – 0.85 PPP over 27 post-up defensive possessions.
• Hilton Armstrong- 0.93 PPP over 43 post-up defensive possessions.
• Yi Jianlian- 0.96 PPP over 28 post-up defensive possessions.
• Trevor Booker- 1.00 PPP over 30 post-up defensive possessions.

The acquisition of veteran tricks-of-the-trade and some moxie would be welcome from this group. Seraphin’s tough presence and brute strength is a fair sight toward the future, especially when you consider that he’s barely known the organized game of basketball. He’s got so much to learn, but it’s good that his slate is relatively clean.

It shouldn’t surprise that the Wizards perform even better than average when defending individual plays instead of team plays. Against isolations, Washington allows 0.83 PPP, ranked 13th, and against spot-ups, they allow 0.97 PPP, ranked 12.

The Portland Trailblazers, overall, rank 13th in defending plays that end in a FGA, TO or FTs by allowing 0.89 PPP (compared to the 0.90 from the Wizards that ranks 16th). However, on spot-ups, the Blazers allow 1.03 PPP, ranked 22.

Are the Wizards better at closing out and contesting shooters? Or is Washington’s team defense so bad as a result of players tending to worry more about their own man, thus making the spot-up opportunities that exist for their opponents to be not as open?

How about the New Orleans Hornets? Overall, they rank fourth in defense, only allowing opponents to score 0.86 PPP. But on isolations, the Hornets rank ten spots lower than the Wizards at 23rd in the league, allowing 0.89 PPP. And it’s not like New Orleans has faced much less isolations, actually seeing more with 583 chances as opposed to 567 for Washington.

Ideally, teams would rather force their opponents into more isolation play. So under first-year coach Monty Williams, the Hornets will gladly trail the Wizards’ ability to stop individuals if their organization and coaching propels their overall defense to a top-5 unit in the league. Also worth nothing that New Orleans’ 0.93 PPP produced on offense ranks 15th in the NBA; poor offense from the Wizards coupled with their lack of awareness really puts their defense in a hole on most, if not all, nights.

These are simply numbers of a young team, a reflection of growing pains. But they’re also reflections to keep an eye on, because it’s more than just about player implementation, it’s about if those players can realize when they are making mistakes and if they’re adhering to astute coaching philosophy and a good game plan. It’s about “Synergy.”

Other reads from Truth About It:

• November 14, 2010 -- The Wizards’ Struggles with Rebounding, Turnovers and Free-Throws
• November 4, 2010 -- Wednesday Practice Notes: Gilbert Doesn’t Want To Be Witnessed
• October 29, 2010 -- Wizards: Don’t Act Like There Aren’t Any Major Concerns After “Just One Game”

You’ll often hear NBA coaches, especially Flip Saunders, exclaim (perhaps complain) about two things in explanation of their team’s faults: injuries and lack of practice time. Well, with three days off since their last game, along with the report that all 15 Wizards practiced for the first time this season yesterday, there will be little room for excuses as the team travels to Philadelphia tonight to seek their first road win of the season against the 76ers. Stay tuned …

Playing Down Defense?

On Monday the Washington Post’s Michael Lee had a good story about the Wizards’ improved defense since the Gilbert Arenas trade. Now, I’ll take a look at an additional level of defensive statistics.

As Lee wrote, before the trade the Wizards were giving up 105.8 points per game and after, 91 points per game. Since different opponents play at a different pace, thus the possessions in a game will fluctuate, we’ll look at points scored per 100 possessions* as a more balanced factor. Before the trade, the Wizards gave up 109.8 points per 100 possessions, and 96.7 after. So, the difference in pre- and post-trade points per game is 14.8; the difference in points given up per 100 possessions is 13.0.

Interestingly enough, before the trade, the current cumulative winning percentage of Washington’s opponents is an even .500; post trade opponents now have a .579 winning percentage.

Furthermore, on the entire season, the Wizards have played 16 games against 10 different opponents with a current winning percentage of .500 or better — Atlanta (2), Boston, Chicago (2), LA Lakers (2), Miami (2), New Orleans, New York Knicks (2), Orlando (2), Portland and San Antonio — they’ve only won one of those games (a home contest versus the Blazers). Against those teams, the Wizards have given up 107.7 points per 100 possession on defense. Understandable.

The Wizards have played six games against four different teams with records currently below .500 but .400 or above — Houston (2), Indiana (2), Memphis and Phoenix. Washington’s record in those games is 3-3 and they’ve allowed those teams to score 101.6 points per 100 possessions.

Now here comes the part that would seemingly indicate that the Wizards are good at playing down to an opponent (or at least maintaining a status quo of poor play versus these opponents). Washington has played 10 games against seven different teams with winning percentages below .400 — Toronto (2), Philadelphia (2), Charlotte (2), Detroit, New Jersey, Sacramento and Cleveland. Their record in those games is 4-6 and they allow those lower-echelon opponents to score 107.9 points per 100 possessions … which is at a better efficiency than the Wizards allow the best teams to score against them.

Sounds like a team that needs to get better motivated against weaker opponents. And again, as noted, tonight is as good of a time as ever … it will be a test for the Wizards worth some extra scrutiny.

*Using this equation: PP100P = (100 x points scored) / ((FGA – O-Rebs) + TO + (.436 x FTA))

Links.

Congrats to JaVale McGee … who will reportedly be in this year’s dunk contest with Blake Griffin, Serge Ibaka and Brandon Jennings. First Wizards/Bullet in the contest ever? It’s about time.
[LA Times]

Andrew Unterberger is traveling the North American territory and is surveying/reviewing all NBA arenas for The Score/The Basketball Jones. He recently took a trip to D.C. for the December 29 Wizards-Pacers game. I sat down with Andrew before the game and answered some of his questions while he took a ton of notes. One thing that surprised him, which surprised me that he didn’t know (maybe it’s my Beltway Mentality), but Andrew asked about which team dominates the sports landscape in Washington. I, of course, told him Redskins first, second and third. “Even bigger than the Caps?,” he queried? “Yes,” I easily answered. Even if the Caps win a title, or two, or three, I really can’t imagine a day where the Redskins don’t drive the sports discussion in this city. Go check out Andrew’s report, it’s good, fair and accurate.
[The Basketball Jones]

Kirk Hinrich’s athletic glasses will undoubtedly become a big part of the bloggable lore for the Wizards/Bullets franchise … they are much more meaningful than Mike Miller’s greasy blond pony-tail thing from last season.
[DC Sports Bog]

You thought NBA teams were banning gambling on team flights after the Gilbert Arenas-Javaris Crittenton thing? Evidently not the Memphis Grizzlies … because Tony Allen and O.J. Mayo seemingly got in a fight over a gambling debt from playing the very same card game, Boo-Ray, that Arenas and Crittenton participated in. Evidently, it was Mayo who owed Allen money … perhaps Tim Floyd can help out here.
[Yahoo! Sports]

Caron Butler in good spirits after suffering a season-ending knee injury.
[Ball Don't Lie]

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 7, 2011 -- ShareBullets: Plodding Through An NBA Lottery Winter
• December 5, 2011 -- ShareBullets: John Wall and DeMarcus Cousins Think About The Future
• October 18, 2011 -- ShareBullets: A 50-50 NBA Lockout Mess

“Hopefully I can get back to my old self of when I was in Seattle when I made the All-Star team, when I was playing the three position…”

-Rashard Lewis

“We’re going to try to use him a little bit how he was used in Seattle, move him around, let him play a couple different positions, run plays for him where he doesn’t become such a one-dimensional type player.”

-said Flip Saunders, who went on to express that Lewis could play the three or four positions, throwing out several obvious lineup combinations.

Let’s get a couple facts about Lewis out of the way. He was drafted out of high school and this is his 13th year in the league — lot of tread on those tires, 847 games worth, plus 64 playoff games. He also has experienced bouts of knee tendinitis at various points in his career.

Looking at PER (Player Efficiency Rating by ESPN’s John Hollinger — league average is 15), Lewis’ best career seasons came in Seattle in 2005-06 (20.0) and 2006-07 (20.7). He made the All-Star team in 2004-05 with a PER of 19.9.

In those three successive seasons of Seattle’s best, Lewis shot field-goal percentages of .462, .467, .461; three-point percentages of .400, .384, .390; and averaged 20.5, 20.1 and 22.4 points per game, respectively.

That was at age 25, 26 and 27, by the way, pretty much Lewis’ peak. The Wizards may want to use him like the Seattle days, but it’s highly unlikely Lewis will put up those same numbers at age 31. One thing, however, that Lewis has going for him is that there is always a place for  shooters in the NBA … if he keeps making shots, quality shots.

So, let’s think about reasonable goals for Lewis as a Wizard: 16 points per 36 minutes, .450 FG%, .385 3p% — from beyond the arc, Lewis shot .409, .397 and .397 in his first three seasons in Orlando. This year, that dipped to .367.

Running those initial three parameters through the Basketball-Reference.com database, along with narrowing down to players who were 6’9″ or taller and 30 or older, and the historical return is 33 players. One stands out, one who I previously considered could be similar to Lewis. Get Rashard a headband and call him Clifford Robinson, specifically, the 32-year old version of Robinson who played for the 1998-99 Phoenix Suns and had a PER of  18.3; points/36 minutes of 16.9; rebounds/36 of 4.7; assists/36 of 2.6; FG% of .475; and 3p% of .417 over 50 games.

Another BTW, that Suns team won 27 games and featured Jason Kidd for 50 games, Rex Chapman for 38 games, Danny Manning for 50 games, Tom Gugliotta for 43 games and Luc Longley for 39 games. Nice, I suppose.

But back to Lewis’ position influence on the Wizards’ lineup. Most of it will be Flip Saunders and his coaching staff going with what combination works best, but let’s take a historical look how Lewis has fared at each the SF and PF (or 3 and 4) positions over the last seven seasons in three main categories: PER, eFG% and Net PER. [all below stats via 82games.com]

Positions In Seattle.

First, it’s worth noting how much Lewis played each position while in Seattle (his best three seasons, ’04-05 to ’06-07). The percentages you see next to each position for each season below represent the amount of total team minutes at that position that Lewis saw. I’ve also included some of Seattle’s top five-man units in terms of total plus/minus for each season.

2004-05 – SF (57%), PF (7%), SG (2%)

In ’04-05, Seattle’s top 5-man unit in plus/minus was Antonio Daniels-Ray Allen-Vlad Radmanovic-Nick Collison-Danny Fortson (+56). Lewis was featured in the next three best plus/minus lineups:

• Luke Ridnour-Allen-Lewis-Radmanovic-Reggie Evans (+49)
• Daniels-Allen-Lewis-Radmanovic-Fortson (+46)
• Daniels-Allen-Lewis-Radmanovic-Nick Collison (+46)

2005-06 – SF (63%), PF (7%)

Seattle top plus/minus lineups:

• Ridnour-Allen-Lewis-Evans-Collison (+24)
• Earl Watson-Allen-Lewis-Chris Wilcox-Johan Petro (+20)
• Watson-Allen-Lewis-Wilcox-Robert Swift (+16)

2006-07 – SF (43%), PF (14%)

Seattle top plus/minus lineups:

• Ridnour-Allen-Lewis-Wilcox-Collison (+80)
• Ridnour-Allen-Lewis-Wilcox-Petro (+26)
• Watson-Allen-Mickaël Gelabale-Wilcox-Collison (+22)

Worth observing that Lewis played the least amount of SF his last year as a Sonic and saw his most time at SF the previous season, ’05-06. Also worth observing that often times, Lewis found success at the three spot playing next to a bruising four man, such as Chris Wilcox, or with a five man who was a willing passer, Nick Collison. The Wizards don’t really have adequate contributions in either of those categories from their big men.

Now for the SF vs. PF statistical comparisons (click the images for a larger version, raw data found here) SF = Blue, PF = Red.

PER

Lewis’ PER while playing SF in Seattle remained relatively consistent, but interesting to note that he did the best at PF when he played the most at the position in ’06-07. Seattle’s best lineup with Lewis at the PF that year was Watson, Allen, Gerald Wilkins, Lewis and Collison (+6). Lewis performed better at PF his first year in Orlando, ’07-08, about the same at both positions his second year, and fared much better as a SF last season. Clearly his PER in both regards has significantly dropped off his season, and curiously enough, he’s fared the worst at SF.

eFG%

Effective Field Goal Percentage is a statistic that adjusts for the fact that a 3-point field goal is worth one more point than a 2-point field goal.

In his ’04-05 All-Star season, Lewis was shot the ball a lot better as a SF, but that discrepancy narrowed by his last season in Seattle, when again, he played better at PF. Lewis’ eFG% dropped off when he played SF in Orlando, but it’s understandable that he’d probably have better, more open shots when playing the PF next to Dwight Howard. Sure, Lewis’ SF numbers in 2009-10 are awesome, but he only played 1% of all available Orlando minutes at the SF spot.

Net PER

The difference in the PER of Lewis at each position from the opposing player’s PER at that same position.

In Seattle, Lewis always out-played his counterpart when playing the SF position. He fared better than his counterpart at PF in two of those seasons, just not as effectively. In Orlando, Lewis out-performed his counterpart at the PF spot in all seasons except for last season, ’09-10.

Conclusion.

Lewis might be able to find success at the SF spot in Washington, but the evidence points to a problem most assumed would arise when the trade was announced. How can you play Lewis at the SF when the best complimentary skills for his game are mostly not offered by the other Wizards big men?

Andray Blatche has shown he’s willing to pass, but he also is not a presence down low and fires way too many shots from the perimeter, where Lewis likes to prowl. JaVale McGee plays inside, if you call it that, but is immune to passing and a selfish offensive player. Yi Jainlian plays a very similar game to Lewis, in fact, Rashard is the exact player David Thorpe compared Yi to when I spoke with him this summer — so, I doubt those two will be great side-by-side, unless, perhaps they’re paired with a more defensive-minded, less offensive-minded big like Hilton Armstrong.

It’s going to be an interesting experiment with more chips stacked against it than stacked for it. Time for Flip Saunders to show how creative he can get.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• January 5, 2012 -- DC Council Game 6: Wizards 85 at Magic 103: Making Progress Harder To Find
• January 14, 2011 -- Rashard Lewis Would Rather Be A Roadie
• December 19, 2010 -- One Digestion of The Gilbert Arenas-Rashard Lewis Trade

[Gilbert Arenas takes a bow after his 60 point game vs. the LA Lakers on December 17, 2006.]

Twenty-two down with game 23 coming tonight in D.C. against jersey No. 24 and his LA Lakers. 60 games to go on the season for the Wizards? Seems like a lot … until it isn’t. What also seems like a lot is the fact that a Los Angeles purple and gold team will be gunning to avenge the moral victory Washington recently achieved on their court … while gaining an Andrew Bynum back against a Wizards team likely to be without Andray Blatche, perhaps without John Wall, and with Gilbert Arenas “generally sore” … whatever that means.

So do you want to see the Wizards take on the Lakers tonight for free anyway? Sure you do. Because guys like Trevor Booker and Kevin Seraphin, a duo who helped fuel Washington’s valiant attempts in LA, are expected to see their fair share of time on the court with the swollen knee of 7-Course-Meal-Dray expected to keep him inactive. The Nick Young-Kobe Bryant Show Part II could be fun to watch as well.

Hence, TAI is giving away more free tickets courtesy of StubHub … this time, three tickets to an upper level suite (I know, three tickets is an odd number, but three is also company.)

How can you score these free Wizards-Lakers tickets? At around 3 PM EST this afternoon, Tuesday, December 14, I will be posting a Wizards-related trivia question on the TAI Twitter account: @Truth_About_It. The first person to email, NOT Tweet, the correct answer to truthaboutit@gmail.com will have three (3) suite tickets waiting for them at the Verizon Center Will Call for tonight’s game. Seems easy enough.

UPDATE: We have a winner. Brent Sanet was the first to correctly email ‘Ledell Eackles’ as the answer to the Twitter Trivia Question below:

“Before playing last game @ US Airways Arena in 97, the Wash. Wizards signed a player who prev. played in 345 total gms as a Bullet. Name him”

Stats On A Season.

Six wins in 22 games, zero in 12 efforts on the road, means that the Wizards have a zero-percent chance to make the playoffs according to the Playoff Probabilities Report from Basketball-Reference.com (or at least less than a 0.1-percent chance), even though they are technically only 3.5 games out of the eight spot in the East. On a note that you’re probably used to, according to the same report, the Wizards currently have a 14.9-percent chance to win the Draft Lottery, which is third highest in the League — and the Wizards have already been beaten by the two teams with better chances, the Cleveland Cavaliers and Sacramento Kings.

What did we expect? For the Wizards to blast through the first fourth of the season on a pace to win 20.5 games on the entire year? Perhaps we should have. What we probably didn’t expect is for so many various Wizards players, injuries notwithstanding, to display disappointing efforts as individuals which has led to sub-par results as a team. Perhaps we should have.

One can all too easily point out the defensive inefficiencies of individuals such as Andray Blatche and JaVale McGee until they’re out of pixels. Let’s just say as a collective unit, the Wizards cannot protect the rim. Let’s check the stats (via HoopData):

16.8

Washington is tied with the New York Knicks for second most in the NBA in letting 16.8 made field-goals per game at the rim. Toronto allows a league-high 17.5.

68.5%

Washington opponents make their shots at the rim at a rate of 68.5-percent, third highest in the NBA behind Sacramento (72.1) and Phoenix (68.6).

32.7%

Washington opponents gather 32.7-percent of all offensive rebounds available to them — the highest percent in all the league. Defensive boards for the Wizards, big problem.

Player Team APER Rankings.

APER (alternate PER) was developed by John Hollinger of ESPN and modified by Joe Treutlein of HoopData.

These rankings put two things into perspective: 1) JaVale McGee’s game is more beautiful than it is ugly right now, but frustrating nonetheless because it’s like a good looking bacon cheeseburger that’s really made of turkey, and 2) Yi Jianlian needs to recover from injury and then make strides to prove his worth going into a contract summer, else he’ll be labeled a soft bust in the realm of, but not quite reaching the proportions of Kwame Brown.

A 60 Point Memory.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• December 8, 2010 -- Chalk Up Moral Victory No. 3 In 115-108 Loss To Lakers; Should The Wizards Be Ready To Stand Behind Their Message Of Toughness?
• October 3, 2011 -- Washington Wizards Suspensions & Fines Since 1995
• January 27, 2011 -- ShareBullets: Portraits Of A Young Team & Wizards Picture Leftovers

What do you write after a team shoots 65.8% (50-76 field-goals) on their way to a 114-83 win over the Wizards?

Chalk it up to the Boston Celtics being a great-passing veteran team at home and the Wizards being a non-passing, relatively inexperienced team on the road and move on, I suppose.

Oh, lest I forget a stat fact that you’ll surely be made aware of by others: the Boston Celtics had 32 assists, the Washington Wizards had 31 made field-goals.

But let’s go back to this field-goal percentage thing. It’s kind of like winning in overtime when you didn’t deserve it … a win is a win.

Sure, the Celtics were pretty hot and likely would have been scorching the nets against most teams on this very night on their own parquet floor. But 65% is 65% … this game won’t be exempt from the Wizards’ defensive statistical record no matter how in the zone the Celtics were.

Boston’s starters (Rajon Rondo, Ray Allen, Paul Pierce, Kevin Garnett and Shaquille O’Neal) took one look at a Wizards bunch that can best be described as a room full of people who all just met and speak different languages trying to put together a piece of IKEA furniture without any instructions, shrugged their shoulders and shot 35-49 from the field, a cool 71.4%.

According to Basketball-Reference.com, since 1986-87, aka the last 25 seasons including this one, the Wizards/Bullets have allowed an opponent to shoot over 60% for a game 18 times. That’s 18 times over 1,945 games. Well, make it 19 times over 1,946 games now.

Actually, make it once.

The Wizards have never allowed an opponent to shoot 65-percent from the field or better in the last 25 seasons until Wednesday night. The 65.8% shot by Boston is the most since January 31, 1990 when the world champion Detroit Pistons shot 64.7% in a 133-109 win over the Washington Bullets.

And believe it or not, the franchise has also once before let an opponent accrue 30 or more assists in a game, a number which also exceeded the Wizards/Bullets’ field-goals made for said game (since ’86-87). On April 20, 1988, the Milwaukee Bucks racked up an amazing 46 assists on 56 made field-goals (while the Bullets made just 42 field-goals) en route to a 132-94 shellacking.

Surprisingly enough, however, Wednesday night was the third time this season one team had more assists than the other team had made field goals. On November 7th, the Los Angeles Lakers had 33 assists to 32 Portland Trailblazer field-goals, and on November 15th, the New Jersey Nets had 32 assists to 30 field-goals from the Los Angeles Clippers. (source: Elias Sports Bureau)

And while I’m not sure the Wizards’ loss to the Celtics could be classified as a “shellacking” like that Bucks win over the Bullets — whatever that exactly means — Flip Saunders probably most aptly put is this way after the game:

“It was like men playing against boys tonight.”

Right now, this quote probably ranks third among Flip’s quotes (at least in terms of his tenure in Washington) after “Don’t think it can’t get any worse because it can,” and, “I didn’t sign up for this.”

These are the days of the lives of a rebuilding team in the NBA … and these numbers are likely indicators of much more past that surface assessment.

The Wizards next have a chance for improvement at home against the Memphis Grizzlies on Friday.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• January 11, 2012 -- 64 Points of Wizards History: Who’s Gonna Shoot?
• July 27, 2011 -- Playoff Shooters: Wizards/Bullets Franchise History
• February 19, 2011 -- ShareBullets: The Rare Assist

[Yi Jianlian procures an easy defensive rebound against the Charlotte Bobcats - K. Weidie]

It’s simplistic to look at average team rebounds per game and say the Washington Wizards are the worst in the NBA, but it wouldn’t represent the full story.

The Wizards average a league-low 38 rebounds per game. On the defensive boards they average 27.25, which ranks 28 out of 30; and on the offensive boards they average 10.75, which is tied with the San Antonio Spurs to rank 20 out of 30 NBA teams.

But as you know, rebounds are not soley a factor of the time it takes to play a game. They are also a factor of pace (how fast a team plays and thus how many possessions they are producing, the more possessions, the more available boards), and field-goal percentage (the more missed shots, the more rebounds).

This is where an advanced stat called Rebounding Percentage comes in, which is essentially an estimate of the percentage of available rebounds that a team or individual player grabs. This can be broken into Total Rebound Percentage (TRB%), Offensive Rebounding Percentage (ORB%) and Defensive Rebounding Percentage (DRB%).

Using the statistical prowess of Basketball-Reference, we’re able to see that the Wizards are ranked 22nd in DRB% with .715; Orlando ranks first in the league with .811 and Phoenix ranks 30th with .648. The league average DRB% is .730.

So, as far as securing those defensive boards, the Wizards are far from the worst, but it’s worth noting that Washington allows teams to shoot .479 against them, which is fourth highest in the league. So, theoretically, there aren’t as many defensive boards to secure when the Wizards defend.

In terms of ORB%, the Wizards rank 21st with .253. The Raptors secure the most available offensive rebounds with a percentage of .329 and the New Orleans Hornets secure the least with .131. The league average ORB% is .270.

Again, note that the Wizards shoot .444 from the field on the year, ranked 24th in the NBA; league average is .455. So, they are a below average shooting team that creates a fair amount of offensive rebounds, but are also a below average team at procuring what’s available.

On Friday, the Charlotte Bobcats (tied for 13th in DRB% with .733, and ranked 10th in ORB% with .277) obliterated the Wizards on the glass, holding a 48 to 30 advantage (16 to 13 on the offensive end, 32 to 17 on the defensive end). This spawned the following comments from Kirk Hinrich, Yi Jianlian and Andray Blatche:

Flip Saunders had these select quotes after the Charlotte game:

“Got our ass kicked on the glass. Either our guys in there gotta rebound or we’re going to get different people in there.”

“JaVale has five highlight plays a game, unfortunately there’s about 200 plays in a game and he’s gotta get more substance than style. In their breakdown, he was involved in a lot of those. You can’t come out of a timeout and not know as far as what you’re doing. It puts too much pressure on your other players. That’s the situation with young players, they lose concentration in the heat of the battle. So those are the things he has to do.”

“You don’t reward people who make mistakes. I’m just not going to do that. Because if you do that, then young players won’t get better. They’re going to think that if you accept mediocrity, then the best you’re going to become is mediocre. And we’re not going to accept mediocrity.”

“If we can become better rebounders, continue to get turnovers, we’re going to get than many more possessions in a game.”

“We’re not going to go with a major shakeup, but we’re going to give guys opportunities, whether it’s Book [Trevor Booker], or we used Hilton [Armstrong] some tonight, but we’ve got to rebound the ball.”

Going into Saturday night’s game against the Bulls in Chicago, this Tweet from McGee, seemingly the largest target of his coach’s scorn, was perhaps the most encouraging sign:

And the Wizards, against a decent rebounding Chicago team (ranked eighth in DRB% with .747 and tied for 11th in ORB% with .276), went out and did their job on the glass, out-rebounding the Bulls 47 to 40 (17 to 12 offensive, 30 to 28 defensive). Of course, the caveat: the stars were Hilton Armstrong’s 10 rebounds (four offensive) in 18 minutes off the bench, and Gilbert Arenas’ six boards in 32 minutes.

McGee grabbed five boards in 20 minutes of action, Yi Jianlian had two rebounds in just 13 minutes before hurting his knee, and Andray Blatche, seemingly experiencing some knee discomfort himself, pulled down seven boards in 27 minutes.

But as you know, the Wizards lost to the Bulls 103-96, and the story this time wasn’t rebounding, clearly … it was the turnovers and the free-throws, two other huge issues plaguing this young team.

Washington’s offensive turnover percentage (TOV% – an estimate of turnovers per 100 plays) ranks second highest in the league at .167. That being said, the Wizards do a good job of causing other teams to turn the ball over; their defensive TOV% also ranks second highest in the league at .167.

As you’ve likely deduced, the Wizards give the ball away (147 times on the year), as much as they take the ball away (147 opponent turnovers).

However, something should be said about the points a team is able to create off turnovers. The Wizards have been able to create 167 points off 147 opponent turnovers; opponents have only been able to produce 146 points off 147 Wizards turnovers. This is why the other night Flip Saunders spoke of “good turnovers” (traveling, out of bounds, etc.) that do not give the other team the immediate opportunity to score in transition.

Washington turned the ball over 23 times against the Bulls, leading to 18 Chicago points. The Bulls had 15 team turnovers that led to 17 Wizards points. So a relatively negligible effect on the score, but remember this previously mentioned quote from Saunders:

“If we can become better rebounders, continue to get turnovers, we’re going to get than many more possessions in a game.”

The Wizards are still limiting their chances to seize opportunity. But perhaps the easiest chances come at the free-throw line.

Washington is among the worst in the NBA in free-throws per field-goal attempt, ranking 28 out of 30 with a percentage of .202.

Chicago got to the line 34 times on Saturday night and sank 26 of them.

Washington got to the charity stripe eight times, EIGHT TIMES AS A TEAM!, and made only four.

In Basketball-Reference.com’s database, there have only been 10 games in franchise history (since the 1986-87 season) where the Wizards/Bullets have attempted eight or fewer free-throws in a game, the last time coming on February 3, 2010 in a 107-85 loss to the New York Knicks.

We knew this young team led by a rookie point guard would struggle with turnovers. We had a feeling that the thin front line would be inadequate. And the free-throw issue? I guess you can chalk that up to the messy side-effects of a rebuilding team too.

Almost 10-percent of the season is over. At this continued rate, the Wizards will win just over 20 games. This is attributed to much more than these select stats, but these key measurable areas and how the team improves in them will be carefully monitored going forward.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 2, 2011 -- Charting The Wizards’ Defense After Road Loss 25 In New Orleans
• January 31, 2011 -- Wizards Synergy Good & Bad
• January 10, 2011 -- Wizards vs. Bobcats: A Chronology of 0-18 On The Road

[Basketball Court - Georgia Avenue/Howard University - photo: K. Weidie]

Last season was the 31th anniversary of the three-point shot in the NBA. Well, sorta. The three-point line was implemented on a trial basis for the 1979-80 season and set into permanent rule for the 1980-81 season. So, perhaps technically this season is the 31th anniversary of the three-point shot in the NBA. Nonetheless, stats on the shot have been kept for the previous 31 seasons and are available thanks to Basketball-Reference.com.

Kevin Grevey of the Washington Bullets hit the first three-point bucket in franchise history, on opening night against the Philadelphia 76ers at home on October 12, 1979. Evidently there is some dispute as to whether Grevey hit the first three in NBA history; Chris Ford of the Boston Celtics is usually credited with accomplishing this feat, which occurred on the same night.

Over the 2510* games the Wizards/Bullets franchise has played over the previous 31 season (*only 50 games were played in the shortened ’98-99 season), the team has attempted 23,127 threes and made 7,651 of them — a percentage of 0.331.

The 2007-08 Wizards made 575 threes, most in franchise history, at a clip of 35.6-percent. DeShawn Stevenson, believe it or not, led the team with 158 makes.

The ’87-88 Bullets only made 29 three point field-goals all year at a clip of 21-percent. Jeff Malone led the team sinking 10 of his 24 attempts from beyond the arc. But it was John “Hot Plate” Williams who led the team in attempts that season with 38; he only made five of them.

Let’s take a look at franchise average three-point makes and attempts per game through the years (with coaching regimes noted):

[click on image for larger size]

We’ll compare this to NBA three-point history in a future post.

The Players.

As far as individuals, there isn’t much argument that Gilbert Arenas is the most prolific three-point shooter in team history. He’s the only franchise player to make more than 200 in a season, accomplishing the feat twice in ’04-05 and ’06-07 (205 both times). He’s also first in franchise history in total makes (821), attempts (2,285), average makes per game (2.4) and attempts per game (6.8).

Chucking It Up For A Year.

Only four players in team history have attempted five or more threes per game in a season. Arenas has done it six times, and in true Gilbert fashion, two of those times include the ’07-08 season when he only played 13 games and last year when he just played 32. The other player instances include: DeShawn Stevenson (5.0 three attempts per game in ’07-08), Antawn Jamison (5.4 attempts per game in ’06-07) and Rex Chapman (6.1 attempts per game in ’94-95).

You think Arenas is a gunner … at least he made his threes. Our friend Mr. Chapman only shot 31.4-percent on his 6.1 three-point attempts per game. Arenas attempted 7.9 three per game in ’06-07, 7.0 in ’04-05, 6.8 in ’05-06 and 6.1 in ’03-04. He made 0.351, .0.365, 0.369 and 0.375 percent of his threes in those seasons respectively (playing in 74, 80, 80 and 55 games, also respectively).

Looking back, I find it astounding that Arenas attempted 7.9 and 7.0 three pointers per game in different seasons. In NBA history, a player attempting seven or more threes per game (and appearing in at least 50 games) has only happened 26 times. Michael Adams (1), Ray Allen (5), Gilbert Arenas (2), Mookie Blaylock (2), Jamal Crawford (1), Baron Davis (1), Danny Granger (1), Tim Hardaway (2), Rashard Lewis (1), George McCloud (1), Tracy McGrady (1), Mike Miller (1), Jason Richardson (1), Quentin Richardson (1), Dennis Scott (1), John Starks (1), and Antoine Walker (3) are the 17 players who have done this (with number of times accomplished in parenthesis). Gilbert Arenas ranks 15th and 20th in three-point field-goal percentage among these 26 occurrences. Ray Allen has five seasons that rank in the top 11 in 3p%.

From this bar chart showing the 3P% and 3PA from these 7.0-plus 3PA/G season occurrences (ordered by 3P%), you’ll see that Arenas keeps company that ranges from some of history’s best long range bombers to some of history’s notorious long range bummers. Gilbert is also the only one on this list to score more than 2,000 points in such a season, he did it both times.

[click on image for larger size]

Notice in this chart where Arenas lies when you account for True-Shooting Percentage (TS% is a measure of shooting efficiency that takes into account field goals, 3-point field goals, and free throws — since Gilbert has been able to get to the line so much in his career). Arenas moves up a decent bit in the ranks; he has the sixth and seventh highest TS% for those attempting seven or more threes per game in league history. Also notice how terrible a chucker Antonie Walker was in ’02-03.

[click on image for larger size]

The Most Efficient.

In a quest to find out what member of the franchise had the most efficient overall shooting season, while being a threat from long range and a good overall player, I ran these parameters through Basketball-Reference: three or more made threes per game, an effective-FG% of 0.500 or higher (remember, eFG% adjusts for the fact that a 3-point field goal is worth one more point than a 2-point field goal), and a PER of 10 or higher.

I, however, sorted by True Shooting Percentage. The return yielded eight players (Brent Price, Mike Miller, Scott Skiles, Gilbert Arenas, Chris Whitney, Tracy Murray, Caron Butler and Antawn Jamison — with Jamison and Murray accomplishing the feat in two separate seasons). Arenas’ TS% of 0.581 in ’05-06 ranks fourth on the list, full results below [click on image for larger size].

Of course, what the stats don’t show here is that Arenas is the only one on this list who can create his own shot at a much higher level than anyone else. Not that Jamison didn’t/can’t create his own shot, but he was/is more of a ‘junk’ offensive player — if you know Jamison’s game, you know what I mean.

The moral of this story is that Arenas is overall one of the best long distance shooters in team history, and he can still compete with some of the best in the league. But what also makes him effective is his ability to get to the free-throw line in addition to being a long range threat. His most efficient shooting season was 2005-06 when he had a TS% of 0.581 and eFG% of .507 while attempting 6.8 threes per game (making 2.5).

Sure, Arenas played a very limited 81 minutes over four preseason games, three of those minutes coming versus the Milwaukee Bucks when he was barely on the floor due to a groin injury. However, in those 81 minutes, as a guy presumed to be knocking some rust off, Arenas had a 3p% of 0.467, TS% of 0.584 and eFG% of 0.609. He averaged 6.67 three-point attempts per 36 minutes and made 3.1 of them. Note that Arenas only managed to get to the FT line seven times in 81 minutes.

If this season Arenas can at least shoot over 40-percent from three for the first time in his career (I know, that’s asking a lot — his career best is 37.5-percent over 55 games in ’03-04, his third year in the league and first in D.C.), he will be a very valuable piece to the Wizards offense. He will certainly open things up for Wall to penetrate and for Blatche, Yi or whomever else to actually do offensive work in the paint. Plus, I think he can still be a threat to drive and get to the line.

It’s just the getting on the court part that’s the hang-up. But Arenas/Wizards fans should be used to that.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• July 27, 2011 -- Playoff Shooters: Wizards/Bullets Franchise History
• October 21, 2010 -- Worst of the Wizards/Bullets: Shooters Edition
• April 13, 2010 -- The Wizards Wear Hats, and Even Represent the Nats

{flickr/draggin}

The Intro.

- by Arish Narayen

Over the past several years, NBA organizations have increasingly integrated advanced statistics into their decision-making. But exactly how teams employ these statistics in personnel decisions — that is privileged information. The NBA’s trend towards quantitative analysis is seemingly personified by Houston Rockets GM Daryl Morey. It is easy to see why Morey is a darling to stat nerds everywhere: he never played in the NBA, and he got his bachelor’s degree (in Computer Science) at Northwestern, and an MBA from MIT. Morey also serves as chair of the MIT Sloan Sports Analytic Conference. As NBA teams, and media (bloggers) seek new ways to evaluate players, attendance at the Sloan Conference has grown.

In Michael Lewis’ NY Times profile on Shane Battier in February 2009, Morey and Lewis had the following exchange:

“Someone created the box score … and he should be shot.”

I tend to share Morey’s disdain for the traditional, counting stats of the NBA box score. Props to ESPN for adding player plus/minus into their box scores last year, as I’m sure at least a few NBA GMs (I’m looking at you, David Kahn) saw that stat on ESPN for the first time. But plus/minus is just the tip of the mathematical iceberg. While organizations like Dallas, Houston, Denver and others funnel more and more resources into their advanced stats departments, other teams are content with the informational gap, seemingly resting on their traditional scouting laurels. What do we know about the Wizards’ use of new stats? Next to nothing.

Wizards’ team president Ernie Grunfeld has stated that the team does not employ a “stat guy,” but does use “some services.” Let’s hope they have a Synergy Sports account, at least. Sources have indicated that Wizards’ VP of basketball administration Tommy Sheppard was in attendance at the 2010 MIT Sloan Sports Analytic Conference. What Sheppard learned from that experience remains to be seen. However, what we do know about Sheppard, presumably the guy in charge of stats: that he consults with a basketball statistician by the name of Bob Bellotti.

Bellotti got his first break as a statistician in 1988 after he sent copies of his book, Basketball’s Hidden Game: Points Created, Box Score Defense, and Other Revelations, to every NBA GM and coach. In other words, Bellotti is the NBA’s Mel Kiper, Jr. Del Harris — who was coaching the Milwaukee Bucks at the time — contacted Bellotti, and he has been working in the industry ever since, becoming the “stats guy” Grunfeld inherited while GM of the Bucks, who in turn brought the services to Bellotti to Washington.

Bellotti’s principal contribution to the field is his “Points Created” stat, which looks something like this:

Points Created =
PTS + AST * (2-VBP) + (REB + STL + BLK) * VBP -
(FGMiss + FTMiss + TOV) * VBP – 0.5 * VBP * PF

…where VBP = the value of ball possession, which Bellotti defines as the League’s average points per 100 possessions in the previous year.

By nature, I’m wary of statistics that try to boil a player’s value down to a single number. At first glance, I can think of at least two flaws with Points Created (flaws that I am sure Bellotti is aware of — see the interview below):  1) no attempt is made to ascertain the relative value of each part of the statistic, i.e. is it true that an assist is always worth more than a rebound?; 2) Points Created does not account for a player’s defense beyond counting stats: fouls, steals, and blocks. However, Points Created is good at measuring a player’s offensive value; Bellotti cites that “the NBA’s MVP has ranked in the top 4 in Points Created in 25 of the past 26 years” as indicative of this fact.

Clearly, Bellotti is an industry vet who has contributed his work to multiple teams. While he was unable to talk about his consulting with the Wizards, John Townsend’s interview below sheds a lot of light on the mind of Bob Bellotti — the man who, to some degree, the Wizards trust with their statistical analysis.

The Interview.

- by John Townsend

Thanks for the wonderful intro, Arish. Let’s jump right into it, shall we? (After all, we have the Wizards season opener to get ready for.)

On this interview:

Bellotti: “I do work for the Wizards, but I don’t want to tell you what I do for them, or how I do it. I don’t want to give that stuff away.”

Okay. Now, my questions …

(More) On the emergence of Bob Bellotti, Advanced Stats Pioneer:

Bellotti: “Back in the 1980s, I wrote a book called Basketball’s Hidden Game: Points Created, Box Score Defense, and Other Revelations, released in 1988. I published it myself, but I didn’t really have a way to sell the book when I finished writing it.  So what I did was send copies to every NBA coach and every NBA general manager. A lot of them got back to me and wrote me nice letters, but Del Harris — who was the coach of the Milwaukee Bucks at the time — actually called me and said he read the book and had liked the way I evaluated. He asked if I would evaluate all the players in the league for him. That’s how I got started and I went on to work with the Bucks for 19 years. The toughest part was gathering all of the data to use and coming up with a final number for each player. The data gathering was so tough because, at the time, computers were rudimentary and there wasn’t really an internet to speak of, so everything had to be typed in.”

On the origins of advanced basketball statistics:

Bellotti: “It started a long time ago. I’m not sure exactly how it got started, but you go back to the early parts of the game and depending on what types of records were kept at that time, some sort of very basic statistical analysis was done very early on. It really didn’t start growing until the mid- to late-80s, has really grown quite a bit over the last five to 10 years with the introduction of various elements that have pushed things along. There is a tremendous amount of information available to people. It’s a matter of having the knowledge of how to use that information to best help teams and understand how teams work and how players work with each other. There is probably still some growth in the gathering of this type of information and the ways that people can evaluate players, but it’s getting to the point where the analysis now becomes the more important thing, as opposed to the methods that we use to arrive at various conclusions.”

On what Bellotti pores over to complement film study:

Bellotti: “One of the things I try to do is look at player’s or a team’s weakness — where are they weak and how can they get stronger?  You can identify weaknesses fairly easily. The methods that can be used to do this are the linear weight-type of stats [like Win Shares and PER], and then there are things like plus/minus and using the proper efficiency ratings for offense and defense. Once you have all that information together there’s no really cohesive way to pull that all together into one number, so you kind of have to weigh each of those factors and come to a conclusion about a player or team based on that. There’s no real magical number to do that. The other important thing is watching the games and gathering information as you’re watching the games. For instance, defensive ratings. There are very few defensive ratings available these days, but it’s really half of the game. So, that’s kind of a weakness in the analysis of the sport and it’s hard to gather data on that unless you watch the games and keep track of various things.”

On how to quantify defense beyond the box score:

Bellotti: “Well, I think watching the games is the best way. You can’t really get much from a box score. The only stats you can pick out are blocked shots, steals, defensive rebounds … Personal fouls, too, can be considered defensive stats because most fouls are committed by the defense. But there’s so much more that goes into playing defense. If you would watch a game, if you would watch closely enough on the defensive end, you would find that with almost every shot that is taken by the offense, there’s one or two defensive players that are involved in trying to stop that shot — the other players on the floor may have contributed to the situation in which the player takes the shot, but the actual taking of the shot is usually just guarded by one or two people. So, if you look at it from that point of view then you could gather data that way, but it would have to be watching the games. That type of information is not generally available.”

On predicting NBA careers:

Bellotti: “All of my methods are applicable to basketball at any level, whether it high school, college, or pros. Stats for international players translate somewhat to the NBA. They key there is equating what league you’re looking at internationally and how that league compares to the NBA. I have various methods do to that. When I evaluate draft players — the draft each year for instance — I’ll take into account where different international prospects are playing, weight that league compared to the NBA, and then consequently pull the final numbers. You can easily relate an international player to an NCAA player here.”

On John Wall:

Bellotti: “We don’t know yet, do we? We don’t know whats going to happen now. I can’t really talk much about what I do with the Wizards, and part of that was helping them in that area, but he’s a great player and I’m sure he’ll be a great pro.”

On Gilbert Arenas, without talking about Gilbert Arenas, because he cannot talk about Gilbert Arenas:

Bellotti: “One of the things you have to take into consideration is a player’s salary. How much can a team sign a guy for? What’s his expected value? Is it worth it at whatever salary you expect to pay him? Or is it not? Some guys, particularly younger players, may not be very heralded. In other words, they may not have a great reputation for being productive players, but if they get on a team and are put in a certain role which they may be very good at, they can be very valuable for a team — especially because younger generally make less money.”

On why we kept Cartier Martin:

Bellotti: “You have to look at various measures, overall performance, plus/minus, and defensive play. You can put all that stuff together and say, ‘We have enough scorers on this team and this guy is a really good defender.’ It many not show up in his Points Created score, it may not show up in his PER, but given the amount of money that we are paying him, we can use this guy. This guy will be of more value than, say, bringing in a veteran who costs a lot more and can do the same things. A guy like Shane Battier is known for his ability to contribute to the team without scoring. Whenever he’s on the floor the team generally does better than when he’s not on the floor. So, if you get a guy whose plus/minus like that is high year, after year, after year … you look at a guy for five or six years and notice that whatever team he’s on, regardless of how many points he scores, he’s really a valuable player.”

On whether or not two scorers (Gilbert Arenas and Andray Blatche) are enough to carry the scoring load:

Bellotti: “I would agree with that.”

On players Bellotti’s system has pegged to do well and why Grunfeld needs to bow to the stats:

Bellotti: “The two guys that I like coming into the league this year are Gordon Hayward, Who is with Utah, Damion James, who is with the Nets. Hayward was a pretty high pick … but James was pretty far down the list in the first round and I think he’s going to be a really good player. Hayward just has a great basketball sense and he’s going to fit in very nicely in Utah’s system. He may not get a lot of minutes at first, but I think he’ll be very effective in the minutes he does get. Both Hayward and James did well in Summer League, so those my two sleepers. The guy who did that last year was DeJuan Blair, who fell into the second round and was, on a per minute basis, one of the best rebounders in the league. The methods that I use are good at spotting things like that.”

[Editor's Note/Beating A Horse On Life Support: Clearly the DeJuan Blair analysis fell upon deaf ears. Sure, selecting Jermaine Taylor with the 32nd pick instead and selling him to the Houston Rockets for $2.5 million cash was peddled by management as the right move because the 2009-10 Wizards were set to be a "veteran" team. But also know that rebounding was a glaring need, and Blair was pegged by some to be, statistically, the best rebounder in college basketball history. And sure there were concerns about Blair's knee injury history, but using a second round pick would have been well worth the risk.

Instead, Grunfeld used the money gained from Houston to sign a 34-year old Fabricio Oberto, who is now in Portland. The San Antonio Spurs nabbed DeJuan with pick 37; Blair went on to make the All-Rookie second team and now starts for the Spurs.

Finally, and surely, one could say that a lot of teams passed on Blair ... but on draft night, it was painfully obvious that the Wizards should have selected Blair. Now, you have what is perhaps one of the darkest blemishes on Grunfeld's record, worse than trading the fifth pick for Mike Miller and Randy Foye, especially when the statistical measurements of a trusted consultant prove that Blair should have been ripe for the picking. -K. Weidie]

On whether or not we should keep waiting for Nick Young to become a star(ter):

Bellotti: “The guys who do well are those who make a high percentage of their shots, get a certain percentage of rebounds per minute, and play well coming off the bench. They may not be getting a lot of minutes, but for the minutes that they’re getting, they’re really producing quite well. So there are a number of players each year who do that. Sometimes they go on to become stars; sometimes they don’t. It’s just hard to determine why a certain guy becomes a star or why he doesn’t, even though he may have started for the bulk of his career.”

On injuries:

Bellotti: “Injuries are a huge factor. You have guys on the injured list quite a bit. You look at the kid from Baylor — Ekpe Udoh. He got hurt right off the bat and he looked like he would be a really solid pro, but you just don’t know that. Blake Griffin is another guy. You don’t know what he’ll come back and play like. [Note: He looks better than never. -- Townsend] He was a cinch to be a real impact starter and perhaps an All Star player, but sat out his whole first year. Greg Oden? Same thing. Sat out his first whole year. Injuries can really mess up a player’s career. If they’re on a trajectory where they appear to be really good players, that can be kind of an ‘X-factor’. It also depends on the player who is injured, the kind of work ethic he has, how hard is he going to work in rehab to get back. You get some guys who don’t work as hard as others.”

On whether advanced stats and mathematics have changed basketball:

Bellotti: “They’ve definitely changed the way that teams look at their players. The same way that that happened for baseball. Fifty years ago, you didn’t have baseball teams looking at player stats in such detail, and now you do. That’s really changed the way teams have gone about acquiring players, trading players, drafting players and I think the same is goes for basketball. It probably hasn’t reached its peak, where it’s kind of a given for all 30 teams yet, but it’s getting pretty close. Most teams are heavily into [advanced statistics].”

On the future of the game:

Bellotti: “One of the things that I’ve heard is that in the future, there might be sensors on the court, implanted in the floor, implanted in a player’s sneaker, so that you can track where a player goes on the court and which of those patterns are typically more successful. So. I think as technology advances, the analytical side of the business will advance also.”

Many thanks to Mr. Bellotti for his time.
For more on him, check out BellottiBasketball.com.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• February 5, 2011 -- So You Think You Can Rebuild A Team: The Gilbert Arenas Version
• October 19, 2010 -- A Wizards Summer of Relaxing
• July 2, 2010 -- CHECK MY STATS: Kirk Hinrich, Sioux City Shooter

[Shaw Rec. Center - Washington, D.C. - K. Weidie]

In mid-September, ESPN.com contributor Tom Haberstroh made an attempt to determine the five worst players in the franchise history of each NBA team [ESPN Insider]. The requirements, along with the implementation of John Hollinger’s PER, were:

“… a player needed to have played at least 10 minutes per contest over the course of at least 100 career games with the franchise. Furthermore, we’ve added the “Bruce Bowen Corollary” to exempt players who started for championship teams.”

And the list of distinguished gentlemen for the Bullets/Wizards franchise:

And while a standard qualification is necessary to measure across all teams, it’s still subjective. Any of us could find other players just as bad, or worse, using the database of Basketball-Reference.com. Today, I’ll focus on bad shooting players in franchise history.

For instance, for a single season I wanted to find out how many players in franchise history (in BBR’s database ranging from 1946-47 to now) appeared in 70 or more games, averaged 20 or more minutes per game, but with a PER of 10.0 or less.

You’ll see that seven players make this list, one of whom, Charles Jones, also appears on ESPN’s all-time worst list. Jared Jeffries’ PER of 8.7 in 2003-04 is the worst in franchise history for someone playing the aforementioned amount of time. Jarvis Hayes was also pretty bad in that same ’03-04 season, pulling down a PER of 9.4 (5th worst on the list). Jeffries shot 37.7-percent from the field on 5.7 attempts per game; Hayes shot 40-percent on 9.9 FG attempts per game.

Worth noting that when Jeffries was on the court that year, the Wizards’ “defense” allowed four less points per 100 possessions (via 82games.com), and total team rebounding percentage went up 4.1-percent. Effective FG% allowed went down 1.7-percent when Jeffries was on the court. Of course, the Wizards’ team eFG% went down 2.6-percent when Jared was on the court too. So, keep what Jeffries did on the defensive end in mind when you notice that he shot 21.7-percent on any FG attempt beyond six feet from the basket in ’03-04.

Which got me thinking more about shooters …

I wondered which player in franchise history has jacked up the most jumpers in the most futile manner. In this instance, my parameters were: a player who has attempted more than 750 field-goals in a single season and shot 40-percent or less from the field in doing so.

That list includes (in order of “best” sub-40 FG-percent to worst): Kevin Loughery (’66-67 – .398), Larry Hughes (’03-04 – .397), Michael Adams (’91-92 – .393), Gilbert Arenas (’03-04 – .392), DeShawn Stevenson (’07-08 – .386), Woody Sauldsberry (’62-63 – .384), and Slick Leonard (’61-62 – .375).

You’re probably noticing the respective seasons of Hughes and Arenas above and the aforementioned seasons of Jeffries and Hayes made 2003-04 a pretty crappy season. Well, it was the first season after the Michael Jordan era and the first in the Eddie Jordan/Gilbert Arenas era. Arenas only played 55 games that year, missing a large chunk of time due to a lingering abdominal strain; and Hughes only played in 61 games, mostly due to a broken wrist. The Wizards won 25 games that year and shot 42.1-percent as a team.

The only team in franchise history that shot worse than that ’03-04 squad was the ’61-62 Chicago Packers, the first season in franchise history. The Packers shot 41.2-percent and won 18 out of 80 games that season. The aforementioned Slick Leonard attempted 1,128 shots, but only made 423 of them; his average of 16.1 points per game was second on the team to Walt Bellamy’s 31.6 points on 51.9-percent from the field. So Slick, now a radio analyst for the Indiana Pacers, might have had the worst shooting season in franchise history.

But, Volume …

The numbers so far don’t completely consider volume per-game shooters over the course of more than two seasons. So I then checked the BBR database for all players who appeared in at least roughly two seasons with the franchise (160 total games or more) and attempted over 15 field-goals per 36 minutes. Basketball-Reference returned 26 players, the worst of those being Kevin Loughery.

Loughery played 591 games with the franchise (all in Baltimore) and averaged 17.8 attempts per 36 minutes during his time. He only made 41.5-percent of his 9,209 attempted field-goals … which is just slightly above the terribleness experienced during the Mitch Richmond era in D.C. Richmond played 5,525 total minutes with the franchise, attempting 2,356 total shots (15.4 attempts/36) and made just 41.7-percent of them.

Go ahead and think about the Chris Webber for Mitch Richmond and Otis Thorpe trade and smack yourself on the head for good measure.

Finally, Free-Throws …

I’m pretty majorly concerned about the Wizards’ ability to make free-throws this season. No one is underestimating the importance of free-throws, but we are certainly looking past them in terms of how they will affect the outcome of many games, especially on a team with a young, and perhaps fragile, psyche. Free-throw shooting is why my prediction of 34 wins could be a bit auspicious.

As a team, the Wizards were 106-160 (66.3-percent) from the free-throw line in seven preseason games. Again, we know, “preseason” … but the worst free-throw shooting team in franchise history, that ’61-62 Chicago Packers team, managed to make 67.3-percent of their foul shots. Of course, that grind-it-out squad of the early 60s averaged 36.3 free-throw attempts per game in the pre-shot clock era. These fast-paced preseason Wizards averaged 22.9 free-throw attempts over seven meaningless games.

Over the previous 20 franchise seasons out of 49 total (1990-91 to 2009-10), four of those teams finished in the bottom 10 of the franchise’s all-time worst free-throw shooting teams — ’97-98 (0.691 FT%, 26.3 FTA/G); ’98-99 (0.705, 24 FTA/G); ’96-97 (0.707, 24.1 FTA/G); and ’03-04 (0.714, 27 FTA/G).

Through dazzling dunks, alley-oops and blazing quickness, a lot of people will be able to look past speed bumps of youthful growth, such as turnovers and missed shots, during the 2010-11 season. But I have feeling that free-throws, when the clock is stopped and John Wall’s speed is negated, is what will cause Flip Saunders, and fans, to grimace with instances of indigestion and hair loss.

At least it’s something to keep an eye on.

Other reads from Truth About It:

• July 27, 2011 -- Playoff Shooters: Wizards/Bullets Franchise History
• November 2, 2010 -- Best of The Wizards/Bullets: Three-Point Shooting and Gilbert Arenas
• June 4, 2009 -- The Epic Tale of Eddie Jordan: Connections, Relationships, and the Basketball Community